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Lynching and Terrorism, Speech, and R.A. V.:
The Constitutionality of Wisconsin's
Hate Crimes Statute
David Chang"
"[T]he first civil right of every American is to be free of domestic violence. "
Richard Nixon1

I. lntroducdon
Ours is a society with a tradition of diversity. The diversity
is a source of richness and strength, a "gorgeous mosaic," as
described by Mayor David Dinkins,2 of Native Americans,
Europeans, Africans, Asians, Muslims, Jews, Protestants, Catholics,
atheists, men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals.
This diversity has always been accompanied by an ugly side.
There is also a tradition in America of hatred and conflict among
members of different groups. 3 Indeed, there is a tradition of violence

• Professor of Law, New York Law School; Co-Chair, Board of Directors, New
York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project; B.A., Haverford College, 1979;
J.D., Yale University, 1982. I would like to thank Steven Lapsker, New York Law
School '95, for valuable research assistance and Camille Broussard, Head of Reference
Services, for her extraordinary research expertise. Joyce Saltalamachia and Arthur
Leonard read earlier drafts and provided helpful comments.
1
Transcripts ofAcceptance Speeches by Nixon and Agnew to the G. 0. P. Convention,
N.Y. TIMF.S, Aug. 9, 1968, at A20.
2
See Josh Barbanel, Campaign Matters; The Middle Class Asks Dinkins for
Solutions, N.Y. TIMF.S, July 13, 1989, at Bl.
3
See Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the Legitimization of
Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 537, 543 (1987) ("Despite constitutional
safeguards and protections of individual rights, our national history and tradition abound
with examples of intolerance, contempt, and hatred for persons whose lifestyles, beliefs,
or human condition deviated ever so slightly from the mainstream. Tolerance was
apparently, never a strong virtue in America.").
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by the stronger, motivated by hate against the weaker. 4 As hate
motivated violence has characterized our history, it continues to
plague our people today. Traditions, both good and bad, are handed
down from one generation to the next. 5
Many states have recognized that hate motivated crimes reflect
a special social problem and require specially directed deterrence. 6
Hate motivated criminals often believe that they are serving some
higher justice and promoting the social good by cleansing society of

4
Fleeing violence and intimidation inflicted because of their religion, members of
different communities from Europe joined native communities, then displaced them
through violence and intimidation. Descendants of various European settlers removed
members of various African communities from their homes, and enslaved them, through
violence and intimidation. See Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in
Legal Education, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1512, 1521 (1991). The Ku Klux Klan emerged
from the formal destruction of slavery, and for a century helped to maintain the old
hierarchies, through violence and intimidation.
See, e.g., ERIC FONER,
REcONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 341-42 (1988).
Foner notes the Klan's founding and growth in the late 1860s. "Violence, an intrinsic
part of the process of social change since 1865, now directly entered electoral politics.
Founded in 1866 as a Tennessee social club, the Ku Klux Klan now spread into nearly
every southern state, launching a 'reign of terror' against Republican leaders black and
white." Id. at ~42; RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 Goo. L.J. 309, 351 (1991) ("By
[January 1868), the Klan's activities had come to include assaults, murder, lynchings,
and political repression against blacks, and Klan-like activities would continue and
contribute to the outcome of the federal election of 1876 that ended Reconstruction.").
Hate, and hate motivated violence and intimidation, have driven much of our history.
5
This tradition has its notorious legacy in recent headlines. In New York City
alone, Yusef Hawkins was killed because his murderer hates blacks. Death in
Bensonhurst, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, § 2, at 6. Yanke! Rosenbaum was killed
because his murderer hates Jews. Todd S. Purdum, Crown Heights Exposes Fissures
Among Jewish Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at Bl. Julio Rivera was killed
because his murderer hates gays. Joseph P. Fried, Lawyer Seeks to Screen Gay Jurors
in '90 Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at 83. Jermaine Ewell was pummelled, his
skull nearly crushed by baseball bats, because his attackers hate blacks. Anthony Lewis,
The Color of His Skin, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1991, at A17. Each of these individuals
had his life extinguished, or his body broken, because his image fit the profile of a
stranger's hate.
6
For elaboration on reasons that states might favor the special criminalization of hate
motivated crimes, see infra text at 158-68.
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"bad" people who simply do not belong. 7 By the lights of the hate
motivated criminal, the "good" people of society act rightly against
the "bad." Indeed, hate motivated criminals may feel they are not
committing crimes at all. 8 Because history suggests that the problem
is otherwise intractable, it is hardly unreasonable for a state to
conclude that something more than the threat of an ordinary assault
statute might be needed to grab the attention of individuals prone to
hate motivated violence. It is hardly unreasonable for a state to
conclude that the threat of specially directed punishment for hate
motivated violence is necessary to inform these potential criminals
that the "good people" of society have no license to victimize the
"bad." 9
Wisconsin, for example, has enacted a statute that provides
increased penalties for the commission of violent (and other criminal)
acts against persons when a jury determines beyond a reasonable
doubt that a defendant "[i)intentionally select[ed] the person against
whom the crime ... is committed ... because of the actor's belief

7

America's neo-Nazis, Skinheads, and Klansmen represent the extreme pole on a
continuum of people who might be motivated by hate to commit violent crimes. Their
views have been characterized as a "morality of sheer hatred." MARK S. HAMM,
AMERICAN SKINHF.ADS: THE CRIMINOLOGY AND CONTROL OF HATE CRIME 3 (1993).
In 1988, one skinhead defined a "skinhead" to a national television audience: "What
makes a skinhead? Attitude. White power. Cause Niggers suck. Niggers and Jews.
They're half monkeys. They should all be killed." Id. at 54. Furthermore, "evidence
suggests that the number of racist skinheads in the [United States] has been growing at
a spectacular rate." Id. at 11. Tom Metzger, the leader of the White Aryan Resistance,
began producing a cable television program in 1983 which promotes the separation of
races worldwide. A message on his telephone hot line urges white men and women to
"arm themselves intellectually, physically and spiritually" for the "ultimate showdown"
against the "tens of thousands of Mexicans . . . swarming" into California. Tracy
Wilkinson, lWiite Supremacists to go on Trial, L.A. TIMEs, July 22, 1991, at Bl. See
also notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
8
See David A. Gerber, Lynching and Law and Order: Origin and Passage of the
Ohio Anti-Lynching Law of 1896, 83 OHIO HISTORY 33, 38 (1974) reprinted in RACE,
LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: LYNCHING, RACIAL VIOLENCE, AND LAW
194 (Paul Finkelman ed.) (1992) (justifying lynchings by referring to them as a "higher
law" than formal legal processes).
9 Neo-Nazi Skinhead leader, Clark Marbell, stated, "I am a violent person. I love
the white race, and if you love something, you're the most vicious person on earth."
HAMM, supra note 7, at S. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested for, and convicted of,
"breaking into a woman's apartment, beating her until she was unconscious, spraying her
with Mace, and then drawing a swastika on the wall with her own blood." Id.
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or perception regarding the race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person. "10 In 1989,
one Todd Mitchell was prosecuted and convicted under this statute
for battery, and for intentionally selecting his target because of the
victim's race. 11 Mitchell, an African-American, allegedly had been
discussing racist beatings of blacks by whites with his friends. 12 He
asked them: "Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white
people?" 13 Mitchell then noticed a potential target. "There goes a
white boy; go get him," he said. 14 Mitchell and his friends severely
beat and robbed the victim. 15
Had he been convicted of ordinary battery, Mitchell could
have been sentenced to a maximum of two years in prison. 16 Having
been convicted of violating the statute criminalizing the intentional
selection of a crime victim because of the victim's race, however,
Mitchell faced a maximum sentence of seven years. 17 He was
sentenced to four years in prison. 18
On appeal, Mitchell challenged Wisconsin's penalty
enhancement statute as violating the First Amendment's protection of
speech. 19 In an opinion written by Judge Heffernan, Wisconsin's
Supreme Court found that the statute not only violated Mitchell's
protected speech rights, but also unconstitutionally chilled the
protected speech of others. 20 The case is now before the Supreme
Court of the United States, which must decide whether, and the
extent to which, states have discretion to provide special penalties for
crirries in which a defendant has selected his victim specifically
because of that victim's race or other personal characteristics.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision rested on several

10

11

12
13
14

15
16

939.645 (1989).
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 1992).
Jd.

WIS. STAT. §

Id.
Id.
Id.
Jd.

17

Milchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809.

11

rd.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 814.
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propositions. First, by increasing punishment based on whether a
defendant acted with certain motives or thoughts, Wisconsin punishes
thought itself. Based on the premfse that the statute punishes thought,
Judge Heffernan determined not only that "the burden is upon the
state to prove its constitutionality, "· 21 but also that the statute violates
the First Amendment's protection of thought. 22 Second, Wisconsin
punishes speech itself, because a defendant who utters racial epithets
during an assault might be subject to greater punishment than is a
defendant who makes no such remarks. 23 Third, the Wisconsin
statute violates the First Amendment's protection of speech because
it might chill the protected expression of racist, sexist, homophobic,
or other messages by individuals who have not yet, and never will,
engage in hate motivated violence; 24
Finally, although the
"motivation of the legislature [was] its desire to suppress hate
crimes," this permissible and worthy legislative purpose was
outweighed by "the greater evil [of] the suppression of freedom of
speech for all of us. "25 Judge Heffeman's opinion for the Court

21

Id. at 811.
Id. at 814 ("The hate crimes statute enhances the punishment of bigoted criminals
because they are bigoted. The statute is directed solely at the subjective motivation of
the actor - his or her prejudice. Punishment of one's thought, however repugnant the
thought, is unconstitutional.").
22

23

Mitchell, 485 .N.W.2d at 815 ("Aside from punishing thought, the hate crimes
statute also threatens to directly punish an individual's speech and assuredly will have
a chilling effect upon free speech."); id. at 816 (defend~nt who utters racial epithet
during attack is subject to greater punishment).
24
Id. at 816 (chilling effect "extends to the entire populace, not just to those who
will eventually commit one of the underlying offenses") (quoting Susan Gellman, Sticks
and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional
and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 333, 360-61
(1991)) (citations omitted).
25
Milchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817. Judge Heffernan elsewhere stated that the statute
is "designed to punish - and thereby deter - racism and other objectionable biases."
Id. at 814. This is arguably a statement of legislative purpose, and if so, a purpose that
might be invalid under the First Amendment. A legislative "motiv[e]" and "desire to
suppress hate-crimes," however, is constitutionally pennissible. See id. at 817. See also
infra text at notes 158-68. It is conceivable that the Supreme Court might decide to
invalidate the Wisconsin statute in an essentially summary fashion, simply by construing
Judge Heffeman's statement of legislative "design" as an authoritative finding of
legislative purpose that may be at odds with the First Amendment (the punishment of
mere thought), while ignoring Judge Heffeman's clear statement of legislative
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"motivation" and "desire" (the deterrence of hate motivated violence) - a purpose that
is unambiguouslypennissible. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2542 (1992) ("In construing the St. Paul ordinance, we are bound by the construction
given to it by the Minnesota court."). See also infra text at notes 158-68.
For several reasons, the Court should not focus on the W18consin Supreme
Court's ambiguous statement about legislative "design." First, it is not clear whether
Judge Heffernan's statement that the Wisconsin statute "commendably is designed to
punish - and thereby deter - racism" is predicated on a self-conscious interpretation of
legislative intent, or merely an attempted logical inference from the fact that the
Wisconsin statute punishes acts differently depending on whether they were motivated
by racism. That Judge Heffernan's statement of legislative "design" was based merely
on logical inference from the statute's structure is suggested by his assertion that "the
hate crimes statute is facially invalid because it directly punishes a defendant's
constitutionally protected thought." Mitchell, 485 N .W.2d at 815 (emphasis added). If
Judge Heffernan's statement were simply a proposition of logical inference from
legislative structure - and deeply flawed "logic," at that - reasons for according that
statement deference do not apply in the same way they apply to more self-conscious
interpretations of a state legislature's intent by that state's Supreme Court. If Judge
Heffernan's statement of legislative "design" were not derived and articulated as an
interpretation of the Wisconsin legislature's purpose, then concerns for federalism and
respect for the state's policymaking processes are not strongly implicated.
Second, Judge Heffernan's statement about what the statute "is designed to"
do could just as well be a judgment about its effect as a suggestion about its purpose.
If so, the constitutional significance of a statute's effects is a question for ultimate
resolution by the Supreme Court. See infra text at notes 124-31.
Third, the proposition that this statute - or any statute - was adopted for the
purpose of deterring thought borders on the absurd. It has been long and widely
recognized that the government is powerless to deter thought. James Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, for example, acknowledged
that "the opinions of mena dependa only on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds, [and] cannot follow the dictates of other men." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 64 app. (1947) (quoting Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments) (emphasis added).
This undennines not only the proposition that
Wisconsin intended to deter thought, but also the inference that Judge Heffernan
interpreted the statute's purpose- as opposed to, for example, the impact of its "design"
- as the deterrence of thought.
Fourth, even if Judge Heffernan 's statement of legislative "design" is construed
as a statement of legislative purpose, it is critical to account for his other clearly
articulated statement of legislative purpose - the pennissible goal of deterring hate
crime. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 817. Where non-content-based legislation has been
enacted for both permissible and arguably impermissible purposes, it may be invalidated
only when it would not have been adopted but/or the impennissible purpose. See, e.g.,
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). After detennining that the challenged
statute was enacted for permissible administrative reasons, the 0 'Brien Court rejected
a claim that Congress also acted with the impermissible purpose of suppressing speech.
"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
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relied heavily on an article by Susan Gellman, 26 attorney for a
defendant convicted of violating a penalty-enhancement statute in
Ohio. 27 Gellman rests her argument on the notion that penalty
enhancement statutes punish "motive" and that "[u]nlike purpose or
intent, motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element of an
offense. "28
This article seeks to demonstrate that the Heffernan-Gellman
view of hate motivated crimes and protected speech is sloppy, deeply
flawed, and consistently wrong. 29 In Part II, I argue that the
Wisconsin statute regulates thought, speech, and "motive" no
differently from a host of other criminal statutes that have never been
thought to raise First Amendment problems, let alone violate

otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." Id.
at 383. Based on this principle, the Court did not even inquire into whether the
"alleged" impermissible motive actually did influence Congress. It was enough to have
found that Congress did act, at least in part, for a permissible purpose. For the
proposition that Wisconsin's hate crimes statute is not content-based, see infra text at
notes 132-54. For more on the proposition that legislation will not be invalidated as
impermissibly motivated unless it would not have been adopted but for the impermissible
purposes, as the proposition has been applied in the context of racial discrimination, see
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71
n.21 (1977) (proof of impermissible purpose shifts to government "burden of establishing
that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered. If this were established, the complaining party ... no longer fairly could
attribute the injury complained of to improper ... purpose.").
Finally, to dispose of this case simply by accepting Judge Heffernan's
ambiguous suggestion of impermissible legislative "design" as an authoritative state
judicial interpretation of legislative purpose that is binding on the Supreme Court would
decide the fate of the hate crimes statute without developing principles to guide the states
in their efforts to deter hate crime. Why bother to hear the case if it is to be decided
on such a narrowly (and vulnerably) technical basis?
26
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 333 (1991).
27
See State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), petition for cert. filed, 61
U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29, 1992) (No. 92-568).
28
Gellman, supra note 26, at 364.
19
For an excellent critique of the Heffernan-Gellman position along similar lines,
see Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality
of Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1993).
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protected speech. 30
Part III draws a distinction between violent acts committed by
defendants who intentionally select their victims because of race and
violent .acts committed by defendants who intentionally select their
victims because of race while also intending to send a public message
through their violent act. The former is simply a race-motivated
assault; the latter is a lynching. 31 This is akin to the distinction

30 First, Wisconsin's hate crimes statute does not punish thought per se, but, like any
other criminal statute, imposes criminal liability as a function of mens rea. See infra
text at notes 44-51. Second, the hate crimes statute does not punish speech, per se, but,.
like any other criminal statute, may be enforced through testimony about defendant's
statements as evidence of his or her mens rea. See infra text at notes 52-54. Third, the
hate crimes statute is no more demonstrably likely to chill protected expression than is
any other statute for which proof of a defendant's mens rea - through evidence of his
statements or otherwise - is required. See infra text at notes 54-58. Fourth, the notion
that the criminal law punishes purpose or intent, but not motive, is simply wrong, rests
on a false distinction, and is irrelevant to the constitutional issues involved. See infra
text at notes 59-71.
31 According to Professor David A. Gerber, lynching was "mob violence against
blacks" triggered by black refusals to abide by "the basic canons and daily etiquette of
the American racial caste system." David A. Gerber, Lynching and Law and Order:
Origin and Passage of the Ohio Anti-Lynching Law of 1896, 83 OHIO HISTORY 33, 34
(1974) reprinted in RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700-1990: LYNCHING,
RACIAL VIOLENCE, AND LAW 190 (Paul Finkelman ed.) (1992). Let me emphasize,
however, that for purposes of this article, "lynching" connotes a crime such as assault
committed with the purpose of making a public statement, but not necessarily committed
by a mob.
Gerber notes that "[b]y its very nature lynching denied its victims the right to
their say in court." Id. Lynching was, nevertheless, an important and effective way for
the white power structure to express its views and communicate its messages, just as the
legal system does through more formal processes. That lynchings were completed in
public gatherings confirms the intent to communicate as an essential component. A
newspaper account of one Arkansas lynching in 1892 stated:

Ed Coy, the colored brute, who, on last Saturday, committed the
fiendish crime of rape on the person of Mrs. Henry Jewell,
respectable farmer's wife with a five-months-old child at the breast,
at her home three miles south-west of this city, this afternoon
answered for his awful crime by a horrible death by fire in the
presence of 6,000 people. He was burned at the stake.

a

Id. at 198. A series of progressively smaller headlines preceded the article's text:
HOWLED; While the Flames Licked; His Black Bestial Body Into-
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between arson in which a defendant intentionally selects a federal
building as his target, and arson in which a defendant intentionally
selects a federal building as his target for purposes of sending a
public message. The former is simply a bombing of a federal
building; the latter is terrorism. 32 Part III suggests that only those
defendants who intend to send a message through hate motivated
violence -- only those defendants concerned with lynching their
victims -- have any possible claim to First Amendment protection
from the Wisconsin statute. 33 Viewing this violence-as-message -- in
other words, lynching or terrorism -- as presenting the strongest case
for restricting the government's regulatory discretion in the name of
the First Amendment helps place the Heffernan-Gellman concerns
about infringing protected speech in perspective.
In Part IV, I argue that the Supreme Court's decision in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn. 34 does not threaten the Wisconsin
statute, but supports it.
Contrary to Judge Heffernan's view, a
statute is not presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict
scrutiny simply because it makes punishment a function of "the
defendant's biased thought. "35 Rather, only statutes that facially

Ashes. Horrible Atonement of Coy, the Colored Rapist. The
Cringing Prisoner Bound Fast to the Stake Before the Eyes of Over
Five Thousand People. Mrs. Jewell, the Victim, Herself Applies the
Match And Retires, Pale but Resolute, Through the Crowd. Ten
Minutes' Foretaste of That Hell Beyond, In Which, No Doubt, Coy's
Soul Has Found a Home. His Shrieks of Agony Strike on Merciless
Ears. Narrow Escape of a Man Who Favored Hanging. Graphic
Description of Coy's Crime, Pursuit, Capture and Death - All Quiet
at Texarkana.
Id. This newspaper was participating in focusing and transmitting the event's message.
This was clearly a public event, expressing and affirming an ideology through violence.
Indeed, the ideology was so rigid that a man who favored hanging, rather than burning
at the stake, was confronted by twenty "shotguns," and retreated "jiffy without more
ado." Id.
2
' The FBl's "working definition" of terrorism is a "violent act or an act dangerous
to human life in violation of the criminal laws ... to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social
objectives." HAMM, supra note 7, at 107 (emphasis added).
" See infra text at notes 110.16.
54
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
35
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992).
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discriminate based on the content of a message communicated are
presumptively unconstitutional and subject to R.A. V. 's version of
strict judicial scrutiny. The Wisconsin hate crimes statute is not
vulnerable under Justice Scalia's R.A. V. principles for determining
when a statute is content-based. 36 Liability is not defined in terms of
any message conveyed by a defendant or perceived by an audience.
Furthermore, the Wisconsin statute meets the standards developed by
the Court in United States v. O'Brien 31 and Texas v. Johnson 38 for
determining when a statute is not content-based. The statute reaches
both action through which a defendant intended to convey a message
-- that is, lynching or terrorism -- and action in which defendant had
no such communicative intent. 39 Part IV concludes that whether one
defines an unconstitutional intrusion on speech in terms of the
impermissible purpose to suppress particular messages or an
unintended yet undue impact in suppressing messages, the Wisconsin
statute survives as a measure designed to deter hate motivated action
with as little intrusion on valid speech interests as possible. 40
Part V pushes the analysis a step further. It argues that the
hate motivated assault intended as a message -- in other words, the
lynching -- although presenting the strongest context for First
Amendment concerns about the regulation of hate motivated assault,
should nevertheless be deemed "unprotected speech," like "fighting
words" and "obscenity." Indeed, if fighting words are deemed
unprotected or "low value" speech, then it follows naturally that
assault as message -- or, to put it another way, words through
fighting -- should be deemed unprotected or low value speech. This
conclusion would allow the state to target the intentionally symbolic
assault for special punishment, as obscenity may be targeted for
punishment. 41 Wisconsin has not chosen to do so, but has chosen to
treat hate motivated assaults even-handedly, whether motivated by the
intent to communicate a message or not. This even-handed regulation
confirms not only that Wisconsin has pursued the permissible purpose
36

See infra
391 U.S.
38
491 U.S.
39
See infra
40
See infra
41
See infra

'

7

text at notes
367 (1968).
397 (1989).
text at notes
text at notes
text at notes

132-43.

144-54.
154-72.
173-84.
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of preventing palpable social harms by deterring hate motivated
choices to act, but also that Wisconsin's regulation falls well within
any conceivable boundary defining an undue impact on speech. If the
goal and effect of deterring the intentionally symbolic assault do not
violate the First Amendment, then surely the goal and impact of
deterring hate motivated assault irrespective of a defendant's
communicative intent does not violate the First Amendment. 42
The issues raised by Wisconsin's hate crimes statute -- and its
possible invalidation -- are critically important to the United States as
it enters the twenty-first century.
The nation is becoming
43
Demographic shifts may exacerbate old
increasingly diverse.
tensions, engender new insecurities, and create new flash points.
Inter-group tensions are a matter of legitimate state concern, not
toward suppressing the expression of any ideas, but toward
suppressing the impulse to translate those ideas into socially harmful
action. A state can plausibly be concerned with robbery or assault or
murder, regardless of the defendant's specific state of mind. At the
same time, given the evolving realities of American society -- or,
perhaps more precisely, societies within America -- a state can
plausibly be concerned that hatred and prejudice along group lines
create special impulses to act; that the ordinary laws against robbery,
assault, or murder do not sufficiently grab the attention of the
potential hate motivated felon; and that specifically targeted
deterrence is, therefore, required. Recognizing state discretion to
pursue new ways of coping with old problems having new dimensions
respects federalism while leaving full range for people to express
messages of hate in ways that do not destroy bodies and lives.

42

See infra text at notes 186-96.
See Bureau Demographer Tells House Panel Half of Popukition Lives in Suburbs,
AM. MARKETPLACE., June 4, 1992, avaikible in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (in
43

the 1980s the Hispanic population grew by 53%, the black population grew by 13.2%,
and the Asian and Pacific Islander population more than doubled, while the white
population grew by 6%).
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II. Remembering Fundamentals of Criminal Law:
Where's the "Speech"?

A. Remembering Mens Rea: Criminal liability Routinely
Depends on a Defendant's Thoughts
Judge Heffernan determined that "the hate crimes statute is
facially invalid because it directly punishes a defendant's
constitutionally protected thought. "44 In his view, the statute "directly
punishes a defendant's constitutionally protected thought" because it
imposes more punishment on a defendant who assaults motivated by
the victim's race than on one who assaults motivated by greed or by
personal spite. 45
This concern should vanish simply by reading a typical penal
code. Modern criminal law grades crimes and punishment according
to the thoughts a defendant had when choosing to commit his criminal
act. Murder is treated differently if a defendant intends to kill, 46 kills
recklessly, 47 or kills negligently. 48 A defendant who has sexual
intercourse without a victim's consent is treated differently depending
on whether he believed she consented. 49 A defendant who kills,
believing his acts necessary for self-defense, may be exculpated, even
if he was wrong. 50 Thus, the same acts are defined as different

44

State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (1992).
Id. at 816.
46
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.27 (McKinney 1993) ("A person is guilty of murder in
the first degree when ... with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person .... Murder in the first degree is a class A-1 felony.").
47
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.15 (McKinney 1993) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter
in the second degree when ... [h)e recklessly causes the death of another person
. . . . Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.").
48
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.10 (McKinney 1993) ("A person is guilty of criminally
negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another
person. Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.").
49
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 130.05 (McKinney 1993) ("it is an element of every offense
defined in this article, except the offense of consensual sodomy, that the sexual act was
committed without consent of the victim.").
50 N".Y. PENAL LAW§ 35.15 (McKinney 1993) ("A person may ... use physical
force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be
necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the
use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person .... ").
45
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crimes, or not as crimes at all, as a function of a defendant's
thoughts. That criminal liability is routinely a function of a
defendant's thoughts has never been viewed as touching, let alone
violating, a defendant's First Amendment rights of "free thought."
Wisconsin's enhanced penalty statute does not deviate from this
fundamental characteristic of criminal .Jaw. 51

B. Remembering Trial, Testimony, and Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt: A Defendant's Statements
Routinely Are Used to Prove Mens Rea
Judge Heffernan expresses concern that Wisconsin's hate
crimes law would indirectly chill speech by, for example, an
individual committing a criminal battery who otherwise would feel
perfectly free to utter a word "such as 'nigger,' 'honkey,' 'jew,'
'mick,' 'kraut,' 'spic,' or 'queer. "'52 "Opprobrious though the
speech may be, an individual must be allowed to utter it without fear
of punishment by the state. "53 Yet a defendant's statements routinely
are used as evidence establishing criminal liability. The vigilante ·
who is heard to utter, "I'd like to kill you, you weak snivelling,
coward!" before killing a victim is more likely to be convicted of
murder than is one who utters "Don't kill me; I'm in fear of my
life!" before killing a victim.
Judge Heffernan also expresses concern that the Wisconsin
statute would chill hate speech not only by persons engaged in the
acts of murder or assault, but also by everyone else in society.
51

One might argue that the thoughts distinguishing racially-motivated assault from
ordinary assault are more politically significant than the thoughts distinguishing rape
from consensual intercourse or the thoughts distinguishing self-defense from an
"innocent" yet tragic mistake. Within Judge Heffeman's own First Amendment
paradigm, however, one thought cannot be viewed as more worthy or significant than
another. State v. Mitchell, 485 N .W.2d 807, 816 (Wis. 1992) ("Opprobrious though the
speech may be, an individual must be allowed to utter it without fear of punishment by
the state."). Thus, if the Wisconsin statute "punishes the defendant's biased thought"
and is, therefore, constitutionally vulnerable, then all criminal codes that grade
punishment of externally identical acts based on a defendant's .thoughts are
constitutionally vulnerable as well.
52 Jd.
53 Id.
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Quoting from Susan Gellman, he notes:
In addition to any words that a person may speak
during, just prior to, or in association with the
commission of one of the underlying offenses, all of
his or her remarks upon earlier occasions, any books
ever read, speakers ever listened to, or associations
ever held could be introduced as evidence that he or
she held racist views and was acting upon them at the
time of the offense .... Awareness of this possibility
could lead to habitual self-censorship of expression of
one's ideas, and reluctance to read or listen publicly
to the ideas of others, whenever one fears that those
ideas might run contrary to popular sentiment on the
subject of ethnic relations. . . . It is no answer that
one need only refrain from committing one of the
underlying offenses to avoid the thought punishment.
Chill of expression and inquiry by definition occurs
before any offense is committed, and even if no
offense is ever committed. The chilling effect thus
extends to the entire populace, not just to those who
will eventually commit one of the underlying
offenses. 54
This anticipated "chill" is entirely unrealistic. One adhering
to racist or anti-gay sentiments, and inclined to express such
viewpoints toward persuading others, has nothing to fear from a
statute that criminalizes violent action. The idea that Pat Buchanan
could be discouraged from expressing anti-gay views, or that ordinary
guys at the neighborhood bar could be chilled from spouting racist
theories and epithets is fanciful. Contrary to Gellman's speculative
musings, experience suggests that criminalizing murder does not deter
statements such as, "I hate you!" or "I want to kill you! "55

54

Id. (quoting Gellman, supra note 26, at 360-61) (internal citations omitted)
(footnote omitted).
JJ As Justice Bablitch stated in dissent, "(i]t is no more chilling of free speech to
allow words to prove the act of intentional selection in this 'intentional selection• statute
than it is to allow a defendant's words that he 'hated John Smith and wished he were
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Experience suggests that criminalizing theft does not chill statements
coveting material possessions in general, or coveting specific
possessions of friends and neighbors. And surely experience suggests
that criminalizing tax fraud does not deter statements criticizing
increased taxes. 56
Furthermore, to the extent it has any validity, the HeffernanGellman "chill" argument proves too much. Prosecuting a hate
motivated defendant under an ordinary assault statute might require
inquiry into defendant's beliefs toward establishing his motive for
assault, at least if defendant neither knew, nor stole from, his victim.
Thus, toward finding a motive to kill, the life of an individual
charged with killing a black man whom he did not know can be
equally vulnerable to scrutiny for past racist statements, memberships
in racist organizations, or racist books read, whether the defendant
is charged with ordinary murder or racist-motivated murder. 57
Criminalizing arson makes evidence of past statements and readings
about explosives relevant. 58 Proof of criminal guilt often involves
proof of a defendant's past activities, values, and beliefs. So long as
such an inquiry is incidental to the achievement of permissible state
interests, rather than itself the object of the regulation, the unintended
impact on otherwise valuable freedom is, and must be, viewed as a

dead' to prove a defendant intentionally murdered John Smith." Id. at 822 (Bablitch,
J., dissenting).
56 Consider George Bush's broken 1988 campaign promise of "Read my lips. No
new taxes." In July 1992, Bill Clinton reminded the American public of Bush's promise
by criticizing then-President Bush: "What he meant to say was 'No new taxes for the
rich.'" Julia Malone, How George Bush Lost the Presidency and what Happened to Ross
Perot, THE ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 4, 1992, at BS. Senate Minority Leader
Robert Dole was equally critical of President Clinton's tax proposals. In a Republican
response to President Clinton's budget address to Congress, Senator Dole stated:
"We've both heard lots of speeches about sacrifice, but we'll be working with you to
make certain that sacrifice isn't just a presidential code word for more taxes, more
spending and more mandates from Washington." Ann Devroy, Clinton asks Middle
Class to Pay Higher Taxes; President Issues 'Call to Arms' to Restore Economic Vitality,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 16, 1993, at Al.
57
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992); see infra text at notes 72-79.
58 See, e.g., Malcolm Gladwell & Jim McGee, Chemical Engineer Held in N. Y.
Blast; Mideast Immigrant Linked to Salameh, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1993, at Al
(reporting that the suspect "is a 1991 chemical engineering graduate of Rutgers
University" and noting that the suspect's educational background indicates that "he has
certain expertise that lends itself to making explosives").
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necessary cost of criminalizing socially harmful freedom.
C. "Motive" Routinely is Relevant in the Definition of Crimes

Susan Gellman has stated that "unlike purpose or intent,
motive cannot be a criminal offense or an element of an offense. "59
She defines "motive" as "an actor's reason for acting," the "why" as
opposed to the "what" of conduct. 60 Gellman defines "intent" as "the
actor's mental state as it determines culpability based on volition,"
and "purpose" as "what the actor plans as a result of the conduct. "61
Assuming, for now, some meaningful distinction between
Gellman's notions of "motive," "intent," and "purpose," consider the
proposition that "motive," or "an actor's reasons for acting," "cannot
be an offense or an element of an offense." Criminal law routinely
distinguishes among externally identical acts based on the defendant's
"reasons for acting." Consider three examples. First, punishing acts
as attempted crimes distinguishes the same acts by a defendant's
reasons for acting. The person who shoots a gun (and misses),
motivated by a desire to scare someone, is treated differently from
the person who shoots a gun (and misses) motivated by a desire to
kill. The first might be guilty of menacing; the second might be
guilty of attempted murder. The person who junks his car, motivated
by a desire to get rid of it, has not approached the bounds of
criminality. The person who junks his car, motivated by a desire to
defraud his insurance company, might be guilty of attempted fraud.
Second, criminal recklessness is defined by reference to a
defendant's motives. Under the New York Penal Law, for example,
"[a] person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a
circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is
aware of· and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. "62
The concern for the justifiability of the risk incurred necessarily
involves consideration of a defendant's "reasons for acting" -- that is,
59
(IJ

61
62

Gellman, supra note 26, at 364.

Id.
Id.
N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 15.05(3) (McKinney 1987).
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the defendant's motives for choosing to incur the risk. 63 Thus, an
individual who intends to run a red light, aware of the risk to other
drivers and pedestrians, mntivated by a desire to get to work on time,
to get to a party, or just for kicks, .is viewed differently for purposes
of criminal recklessness than is an individual who intends to run a red
light, aware of the risk to other drivers and pedestrians, mntivated by
a desire to avoid a rear end collision or to rush a parent in the midst
of a heart attack to the hospital.
Third, the law of self-defense treats otherwise identical acts
differently based on a person's reasons for acting. An individual who
intends to kill, motivated by concerns for self-defense, is treated
differently from the individual who intends to kill, motivated by
revenge, profit, whim, or anything else. 64 . Even if a defendant is·
unreasonably wrong about his victim's dangerousness, the motive of
self-defense precludes liability for intentional homicide, despite the
defendant's intent to kill. 65

63

Commentaries to the Model Penal Code explicitly recognize that "motive" is
relevant in defining "recklessness."
Recklessness, as defined in ·Section 2.02(2)(c), presupposes an
awareness of the creation of substantial homicidal risk, a risk too
great to be deemed justifiable by any valid purpose that the actor's
conduct serves .... [R]isk, however, is a matter of degree and the
motives for risk creation may be infinite in variation ....
SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHF.N J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCF.SSES
460 (4th ed. 1983) (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTmITE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES 21-22 (1980)) (emphasis added).
154 CompareN.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35.15(1) (McKinney 1992)("A person may ... use
physical force upon another person when and to the extent he reasonably believes such
to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to
be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force .... ") with N. Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.27 (McKinney 1987) ("A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when
. . . (w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of 11uch
person .... ").
65 Gellman recognizes that self-defense challenges her proposition that motive is not,
and cannot be, an element of criminal liability. She notes that "circumstances such as
self-defense or necessity change the fundamental nature of the act itself so dramatically
that, in fact, they provide a complete defense to liability for the underlying crime. n
Gellman, supra note 26, at 366. It is mystifying how she can continue to assert that
motive - i.e., a defendant's reasons for acting - is not, and cannot be, an element of
criminal liability when she acknowledges that a defendant's reasons for acting can be so

472

NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. X

Beyond this, Gellman's efforts to distinguish "motive" from
"intent" from "purpose" are formalistic. One can describe a hate
crime in terms of her notion of "intent" -- "the actor's mental state
as it determines culpability based on volition. "66 Indeed, the
Wisconsin statute explicitly speaks in terms of "intent," by specially
punishing one who "intentionally selects" a victim "because of race"
or other characteristics. 67 One can describe a hate crime in terms of
her notion of "purpose" -- "what the actor plans as a result of the
conduct. "68 The actor's purpose is to cause suffering by a person of
a specific race, religion, sexual orientation, or other characteristic.
Although she relies on Lafave's hornbook, 69 Gellman ignores
the import of Lafave's own recognition that the criminal law does
take account of a defendant's reasons for acting. While Lafave
would describe such legally relevant reasons for acting -- i.e.,
motives -- in terms of "intent," changing a label does not change the
substance. Gellman accurately quotes Lafave as stating:
[I]ntent relates to the means and motive to the ends,
but where the end is the means to yet another end,
then the medial end may also be considered in terms
of intent. Thus, when A breaks into B's house in
order to get money to pay his debts, it is appropriate
to characterize the purpose of taking money as the
intent and the desire to pay his debts as the motive. 70
Thus, in Lafave's view, legally relevant "reasons for acting"
should not be labelled as motives, but as intent. Legally irrelevant
"reasons for acting" should be labelled as "motives."
The
fundamental point, however, is that one is simply talking about a
label for an element of defendant's state of mind -- aspects of his
reasons for acting -- that legislatures can make, and have made,

fundamental as to "change the fundamental nature of the act."
66
Gellman, supra note 26, at 364.
67
State v. Mitchell, 455 N.W.2d 807, 809 n.1 (Wis. 1992).
158
Gellman, supra note 26, at 364.
69
WAYNER. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986).
70
Gellman, supra note 26, at 364 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 228 (2d ed. 1986)).
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legally relevant as a function of their policym~ing concerns. 71
Wisconsin's hate crimes statute does not punish a defendant's
reasons for intentionally selecting a victim because of race. A
defendant could intentionally select his victim because of race for
self-gratification, to impress friends, or, indeed, to send some
message. Under the law as written, these motives are irrelevant.
They are irrelevant, however, not because they can be labelled as
"motives," but because they are irrelevant to the policies the
legislature seeks to serve.

D. "Motive" Routinely is Considered in Criminal
Sentencing and CivU Anti-Discrimination Law:
Proving and "Punishing" Defendant's Thoughts
by a Preponderance of the Evidence -- or Less
In Barclay v. Florida, 72 the Supreme Court held that "a
sentencing judge in a capital case might properly take into
consideration 'the elements of racial hatred' in [defendant] Barclay's
crime as well as 'Barclay's desire to start a race war. '" 73 In Dawson
v. Delaware, 14 the Court held that "the Constitution does not erect a
per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's beliefs
and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and
associations are protected by the First Amendment. "75 Chief Justice
Rehnquist made this statement in the context of upholding a challenge

71

See Grannis, Note, supra note 29, at 190 {"Professor Gellman's logic is
backwards. It is not that 'motive cannot be ... an element of a criminal offense'; it is
that motives are whatever is not an element of the criminal offense, whatever reasons
the defendant may have for taking criminal action that are not defined as elements of the
crime. Conversely, if the legislature chooses to make a particular desire an element of
the crime, this desire then becomes a matter of intent.").
72
463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
73
Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1992) (citing Barclay, 463 U.S. at
949, 970).
74
112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
75
Id. at 1097.
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to specific evidence admitted at a capital sentencing proceeding. 76
Thus, the Court has determined that the factor of racist
motivation -- or, more precisely, the intent to select a victim because
of race -- that has been challenged as an element of Wisconsin's hate
crimes statute may, without violating the First Amendment, be
considered for imposing a death sentence. This is especially
significant because proof of racial motivation at the sentencing stage
frequently lacks the procedural safeguards which protect a defendant
at the liability stage.
Indeed, the Court has never held that a jury must find beyond
a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating facts relevant to
sentencing. To the contrary, the Court has upheld sentencing
procedures in which judges77 find the existence of aggravating
circumstances by a mere preponderance of the evidence78 -- or even
less. 79 If a defendant's racial motivation may be considered in

76
The majority detennined that evidence linking Dawson to the Aryan Brotherhood
was irrelevant to the murder for which defendant faced the death penalty. "[T]he
murder vict~ was white, as is Dawson; elements of racial hatred were therefore not
involved in the killing." Id. at 1098. Furthennore, "[b]ecause the prosecution did not
prove that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had
even enaorsed such acts, the Aryan Brotherhood evidence also was not relevant to help
prove any aggravating circumstance." Id. Thus, the First Amendment is violated if a
defendant is punished based on evidence that proves no more than his "abstract beliefs."
Id. "Associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose," however, to show a
defendant's "future danger," or to show "other aggravating circumstances" relevant to
defendant's crime. Id.
77
See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 743 (1990) (Sixth Amendment
does not require jury to impose death sentence); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460
(1984) (no constitutional requirement that death penalty be imposed by jury).
78
See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (upholding against due
process challenge a statute providing that anyone convicted of certain felonies is subject
to a mandatory minimum sentence if the sentencing judge finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant "visibly possessed a fireann" during the commission of
the offense).
79
In Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), the Court upheld a capital sentencing
scheme that directed the trial judge to impose the death penalty if he or she finds the
existence of certain aggravating circumstances that are not outweighed by the existence
of sufficient mitigating circumstances. Under Arizona law, the defendant has the burden
of proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. The
prosecution has the burden of proving aggravating circumstances. Id. at 686 n.7
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). There was no requirement of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubtthataggravationoutweighsmitigation." Arizona v. Walton, 769P.2d1017, 1030-
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imposing a sentence when found by a judge by a preponderance of
the evidence, it would seem to follow a foniorl that a defendant's
racial motivation may be considered in determining· the degree of
criminal liability if found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, laws prohibiting intentional racial discrimination
in civil contexts such as employment or housing impose liability
based on the same racial "motivation" made legally relevant by
Wisconsin's hate crimes statute. Judge Heffernan's attempt to
distinguish the two contexts fails. Heffernan contends that "[u]nder
the antidiscrimination statutes, it is the discriminatory act which is
prohibited. Under the hate crimes statute, the 'selection' which is
punished is not an act, it is a mental process. "80 He repeats the
point:
As explained above, selection under the hate crimes
statute is solely concerned with the subjective
Prohibited acts of
motivation of the actor.
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . and analogous state antidiscrimination
statutes, such as refusal to hire, termination, etc.,
involve objective acts of discrimination. 81
Judge Heffernan's analysis rests on two elementary errors. First, the
essence of illegal discrimination is not simply an "objective act," but
an illegal purpose underlying the act -- the intentional selection or
rejection of someone because of race. It is not illegalto hire. It is
not illegal to fire. The acts of hiring or firing are illegal if motivated
by race. Second, the Wisconsin hate crimes statute does not punish
a mental process. It punishes a choice to act -- the conjunction of
thought and action. In this sense, the Wisconsin hate crimes statute
and civil anti-discrimination laws treat a defendant's racial motivation
identically. 82

31 (Ariz. 1989).
80
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 816 (Wis. 1992).
81 Id. at 817.
.
82
Justice Bablitch, dissenting in Mitchell, forcefully draws a parallel between civil
anti-discrimination laws and the challenged Wisconsin statute:
"How can the
Constitution not protect discrimination in the selection of a victim for discriminatory
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Like the treatment of race-motivation for purposes of criminal
sentencing, the treatment of race-motivation for purposes of civil
liability has a dual significance. First, it confirms that the thoughts
made legally relevant by Wisconsin's hate crimes statute have been
made legally relevant in other contexts without raising concerns of
unconstitutionally intruding on a defendant's "freedom of thought."
Second, the intent to discriminate because of race is more easily
proved in context of civil antidiscrimination laws than in the context
of establishing criminal guilt. The requirement that all elements of
a criminal offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt83 provides
substantial protection to the defendant under Wisconsin's hate crimes
statute -- a protection lacked by many criminal defend ants at the
sentencing phase and by all civil defendants in discrimination suits.

***
The criminal law routinely imposes liability as a function of
a defendant's thoughts and statements. Making criminal liability
depend on a defendant's mens rea, and making proof at trial depend
on a defendant's statements, cannot be deemed to impinge on a
defendant's constitutionally protected rights of free thought or speech.
Whatever the "freedom of thought" implicit in the First Amendment
might mean, it does not mean that the government cannot make
criminal liability depend on a defendant's thoughts. Otherwise, all
of criminal law would be similarly suspect.

hiring, firing, or promotional practices, and at the same time protect discrimination in
the selection of a victim for criminal activity? ... These are laws against discrimination,
pure and simple.• Id. at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
13
See, e.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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Ill. Does the Wisconsin Hate Crimes Statute Raise
First Amendment Concerns?
Judge Heffernan relied in part on the Supreme Court's recent
decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn. 84 toward invalidating
Wisconsin's hate crimes statute. In R.A. V., the Court invalidated a
statute criminalizing the expression of "fighting words" that "arouse
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion, or gender. "85 Justice Scalia concluded that the St.
Paul ordinance was unconstitutional because it discriminated among
ideas based on the government's agreement or disagreement with the
content of those ideas. 86 Justice Scalia noted that under the St. Paul
ordinance, "fighting words" arousing anger based on race, religion,
or gender were prohibited, while "fighting words arousing anger
based on a broad range of other concerns were permitted. 87 "The
First Amendment," he said, "does not permit St. Paul to impose
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects. "88 Even though the Court had held that "fighting
words" are "not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech, "89 Justice Scalia rejected the "proposition that the First
Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of
II

84
85

112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
The Statute provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

ST. PAUL, MINN. LEOIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). The Minnesota Supreme Court
interpreted this statute as proscribing only "fighting words" that a defendant has
reasonable grounds to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender." In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,
510 (Minn. 1991).
86
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
87
Id.
"Id.
89 Id. at 2543.
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particular instances of such proscribable expression, so that the
government 'may regulate [them] freely. "' 90
Judge Heffernan extrapolated from Justice Scalia's analysis.
By punishing violence in which a defendant intentionally selects his
victim because of race or sexual orientation more than violence in
which a defendant more randomly· selects his victim, the Wisconsin
statute singles out socially disapproved thoughts for special
punishment. 91 Furthermore, Heffernan noted, "[t]he ideological
content of the thought targeted by the hate crimes statute is identical
to that targeted by the St. Paul ordinance -- racial or other
discriminatory animus. And, like the United States Supreme Court,
we conclude that the legislature may not single out and punish that
ideological content. "92
Judge Heffernan misapprehends the boundaries of Justice
Scalia's reasoning in R.A. V. The first relevant premise of Justice
Scalia's analysis was that the defendant, R.A.V., had engaged in
activity that qualifies as "speech" for First Amendment purposes -that R.A.V. was a speaker who had expressed views. 93 Indeed, this
was a reasonable premise as a matter of fact because R.A.V. had
been· charged with burning a cross on a black family's lawn. 94
R.A.V. 's rather clear intent to make a statement through cross
burning suggests an aspect of his behavior that has potential
constitutional significance beyond the "ideological content" of his
thoughts. That R.A.V. was a speaker who had expressed views was
also a reasonable premise as a matter of law, because the statute
under which he had been prosecuted was interpreted as reaching only
"fighting words. "95
In contrast, it is not necessarily true that Mitchell was a
"speaker" who had expressed any views. Mitchell might have
assaulted his victim just for kicks. If R.A. V. had been engaged in
"speech" while Mitchell was not, then regulation of R.A. V. 's activity
might be more constitutionally problematic than is regulation of

90

Id. (quoting White, J., concurring, at 2552).

91

State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Wis. 1992).
Id. at 815.
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
Id. at 2541.
For further discussion of why this is significant, see infra text at notes 98-116.

92
93

94
9S
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Mitchell's activity. While St. Paul was necessarily regulating a
speaker who had expressed views through "fighting words," it is not
necessarily true that the Wisconsin statute regulates speakers or
"speech. "96
The second relevant premise of Justice Scalia's analysis was
that St. Paul had imposed special prohibitions because it disfavored
the subject about which R.A.V. expressed his views and the content
of the views he expressed. 97 As it is not necessarily true that
Wisconsin is regulating speakers who express points of view, so it is
not necessarily true that Wisconsin sought special criminal penalties
for hate motivated violence because it disfavors any subjects or
viewpoints. In short, it remains to be established both that the
Wisconsin statute regulates "speech," and that the Wisconsin statute,
if it regulates speech, does so because Wisconsin disfavors the
subjects of the regulated speech or the viewpoints expressed.

A. Defining "Speech"
It is unquestioned that the sentences in this article are
"speech" for First Amendment purposes. It is similarly unquestioned
that statements uttered on a street corner, 98 or over radio waves, 99 are
"speech" for First Amendment purposes. The essential significance
of both the written and oral activity is the underlying purpose of the
actor to convey a message or to express an idea. My purpose in this
article is to persuade. Howard Stern's purpose on his radio program
911

See infra text at notes 98-116.

97

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.

98

See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1950) ("We are well aware that the
ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence
a speaker, and are also mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous police
officials complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful public meetings. "A State may
not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of
conserving desirable conditions.") (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940)).
99
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of [radio], whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee.").
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is to express ideas. 100 We both are speakers engaged in "speech."
In defining the contours of "symbolic speech," the Court
recently confirmed that the intent to convey an idea is the essence of
"speech" for First Amendment purposes. 101 Toward examining the
constitutionality of a Texas statute that prohibited flag burning,
Justice Brennan noted that in order to "invoke the First Amendment
in challenging his conviction," a defendant's flag burning must be
deemed to "constitute expressive conduct. "102
[A]lthough one violates the statute only if one 'knows'
that one's physical treatment of the flag 'will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to observe or
discover his action,' ... this fact does not necessarily
mean that the statute applies only to expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment. . . .
Because the prosecution of a person who had not
engaged in expressive conduct would pose a different
case, . . . we address only Johnson's claim that §
42.09 as applied to political expression like his
violates the First Amendment. 103
Justice Brennan distinguished an act of dragging a flag though the
mud with "no thought of expressing an idea" from doing so with the
thought of expressing an idea. 104 He suggested that the former is not
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, despite
offending others, while the latter is expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment. 105 The essence of First Amendment "speech,"

100

Howard Stem, a New York disc jockey, has been criticized by the Federal
Communications Commission for alleged indecencies on the air. See Daniel Seligman,
Sensitive Moments in Freedom of Speech, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 104.
101
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
102 Id. at 403.
1
Id. at 403 n.3.
104 Id.
io.s Id.
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therefore, is the intent to express an idea. 106
Defining the essence of speech as the intent to express an
idea flows logically from the two major values courts and scholars
have viewed as underlying the First Amendment's protection of
speech. One rationale views speech as warranting constitutional
protection because speech is essential to debate and decisionmaking
in a democracy. 107 The second major paradigm views speech as
fundamental to individual fulfilment and conscience and, therefore,
worthy of protection from government regulation. 108
For a First Amendment concerned with preserving free and
vigorous public debate, an individual has not done anything valuable
and worthy of protection unless she intends to persuade others to
11

11

106

Justice Brennan elsewhere noted that conduct can be deemed "speech" for First
Amendment purposes when first, '"[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present'" and, second, when "'the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it."' Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). The first element of this judicial definition of symbolic
speech restates the idea that the essence of "speech" is an actor's intent to convey an
idea. The second element can be viewed as providing corroboration for the existence
of the actor's relevant intent to speak. Unless an audience is likely to understand the
message, it is unlikely that the actor intended to communicate an idea.
Justice Scalia has also defined the essence of "speech" as the intent to convey
an idea. He noted that activities such as driving a sound truck, otherwise "nonspeech,"
can become a "mode of speech" when "used to convey an idea." R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545 (1992).
107
See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960). Meiklejohn argued:
Just so far as, at any point; the citizens who are to decide an issue
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or
disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the
result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general
good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community
against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.
The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of
Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage.

Id. at 27.
108
See, e.g.' THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRF.SSION 6
(1971) ("[F]reedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual selffulfilment. ").
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embrace a point of view. One does not participate in debate without
engaging with, and endeavoring to persuade, those having different
views. Thus, this public-oriented rationale for protecting speech
envisions the essence of "speech" -- i.e., constitutionally valuable
activity -- as the purposeful communication of an idea.
Defining the essential characteristics of constitutionally
protected "speech" is more difficult in the individual fulfilment
context, because so many kinds of activity are essential to individual
fulfilment and conscience. Defining the essence of "speech" as the
intent to express an idea, however, is consistent with, if not
compelled by, the individual fulfilment speech paradigm. An
individual, arguably, cannot gain distinctive fulfilment from "speech"
-- as opposed to the fulfilment gained, for example, from using drugs
or committing suicide -- unless her fulfilment is achieved through
achieving her intent to communicate. 109

B. Assault versus Lynching; Arson versus Terrorism:
Finding "Speech" in Otherwise Criminal Acts
The ·foregoing analysis suggests that for First Amendment
purposes, the essence of protected "speech" is an actor's intent to
convey an idea. Thus, while Judge Heffernan might be right that
"[t]he ideological content of the thought targeted by the hate crimes
statute is identical to that targeted by the St. Paul ordinance -- racial
or other discriminatory animus" 110 -- it is not the ideological content
of the thought that triggers First Amendment concern. Rather, it is
the intent to conununicate the ideological content, to express the ideas
tQ others, that triggers First Amendment concern. For .First

109
This is widely regarded as the weaker justification, for constitutionally protecting
speech. Frederick Schauer has effectively questioned the proposition that because speech
is important to individual self-definition, it therefore warrants constitutional protection.
See Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1983). The
wide range of activities in which people engage might contribute to self-definition. What
justifies selecting speech for special protection from government regulation, rather than
sexual activity, all other forms of consensual exchange, .or even nonconsensual
impositions by one person against another (like hate motivated violence}, on the ground
that speech contributes to individual falfibnent?
110
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Wis. 1992):
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Amendment purposes, there is a fundamental distinction between the
"ideological" content of a person's thoughts and the-intent to convey
those thoughts to others.
This distinction helps explain why the practice of defining
crimes as a function of mens rea -- as a function of defendant's
thoughts -- has never been seriously questioned as compromising any
putative First Amendment "freedom of thought." People ordinarily
do not commit crimes like bank robbery, burglary, or insurance fraud
to participate in public debate or to shape public attitudes. People
ordinarily do not commit crimes like murder, assault, or rape to
make statements about public issues.
Any fulfilment people
ordinarily seek from these crimes is not through the intent to
communicate ideas. To impose criminal liability for bank robbery
not intended to communicate a social message raises no special First
Amendment issues, although liability might well depend on a
defendant's thoughts as proved through a defendant's statements. To
impose criminal liability for assault not intended to communicate a
social message raises no special First Amendment problems, although
liability depends on a defendant's thoughts -- acting purposefully
rather than accidentally -- as proved by a defendant's statements.
Similarly, to impose special criminal liability for hate motivated
assault when that assault was not intended to communicate a social
message should not be viewed as threatening a defendant's First
Amendment rights, though liability depends on the defendant's
thoughts which might be proved by the defendant's statements.11 1

111
One might suggest that although the symbolic assault and the terrorist act
represent real efforts by criminals to affect public values and discussion, a far larger
class of crimes might be committed with a narrower communicative intent. Murder
might be committed with the intent to communicate a one-on-one message, "I don't want
you to live." Assault might be committed to communicate a one-On-one message, "I
want you to suffer." Theft might be committed with the intent to communicate a one-onone message, "What belongs to you should belong to me." Murder, assault, and theft
each could also be committed with no communicative intent at all - just for personal
gratification through the acts themselves, or the monetary enrichment from the acts.
Recognizing the potentially broad category of crimes intended to communicate one-onone messages to specific victims raises an issue of whether these criminal acts should be
viewed as containing a constitutionally valuable element. I will later suggest that
communicative intent is necessary, but not sufficient for purposes of defining "speech"
protected under the First Amendment. The intent to communicate an idea symbolically
through the breach of otherwise valid law renders the "speech" unprotected, or "low
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It is, however, conceivable that some might wish to "make a
statement" through robbery, murder, assault, or rape. Making a
statement is, after all, frequently an essential purpose of terrorism,
through arson, kidnapping, armed robbery, or other crimes. 112
Similarly, making a statement is an essential purpose of lynching, a
crime with a distinctive American pedigree. 113 At its core, the
tradition of lynching reflected the intent to send messages to AfricanAmericans who refused to be bound by custom. 114 Accepting the
foregoing analysis, one must conclude that criminalizing hate
motivated violence might touch upon a defendant's First Amendment
interests only to the extent that those who assault, maim, or kill do
so with the intent to convey an idea. JJS Lynching (or terrorism) is
speech; ordinary assault (or arson), lacking the intent to convey an
idea symbolically, is not. 116

value." See infra text at notes 173-84. This applies not only to the narrow
communicative purpose of sending a one-on-one message to the victim, but also to a
broader purpose of communicating to the larger community implicit in lynching and
terrorism. See infra note 184.
112
After the recent explosion at the World Trade Center, New York Governor Mario
Cuomo stated about terrorism, "Fear is another weapon that is used against you. That's
what terrorists are all about. What they're trying to do is deny you normalcy." John
Aloysius Farrell, Suddenly, Questions of Security Joli America the Invulnerable;
Explosion in New York, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1993, at 1.
113
See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 4, at 351 ("up to the time of the modern civil
rights movement, lynching would be virtually an everyday occurrence."); supra note 31.
114
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 4, at 352 ("Between 1882 and 1968, 4743 persons
were lynched, the overwhelming number of these in the South; 3446 of these persons
were black, killed for the most part for being accused in one respect or another of not
knowing their place.") (citations omitted). See supra note 31.
115
This is true both within a political debate paradigm and a self-fulfilment
paradigm. Without the intent to express an idea, an individual does not participate in
political debate. Without the intent to express an idea, an individual cannot be seeking
fulfilment through "speech," though he might be seeking fulfilment through inflicting
physical pain. Again, justifying the protection of "speech" with a value of self-fulfilment
does not mean that an individual is engaged in protected "speech" whenever he seeks
fulfilment, but only when he seeks fulfilment through whatever is distinctively "speech."
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
116
This defendant might argue that he is being prosecuted under an unconstitutional
law on grounds of overbreadth. In doing so, however, he would rely on the putative
rights of those who do intend to express a message through lynching. For the argument
that assault and arson intended to communicate messages should be deemed "unprotected
speech," see infra text at notes 173-84; infra note 184.
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IV. Identifying the Unconstitutional Intrusion on "Speech":
Whose Burden to Prove What?
As the foregoing analysis suggests a basis for determining
when hinging criminal liability on a defendant's thoughts does, and
does not, implicate a defendant's First Amendment interests, it
also provides a basis for potentially distinguishing R.A. V. 's
activity from Mitchell's activity. The prosecution of R.A.V.
rather clearly punished an individual who was engaged in
"speech." Like one who burns a flag at a public gathering, or one
who burned a draft card in the late 1960s, R.A.V. rather clearly
intended to express a point of view by burning a cross on the lawn
of his black neighbor. The prosecution of Mitchell, however,
does not necessarily implicate a defendant's First Amendment
interests. Mitchell did not necessarily intend to convey an idea in
assaulting his victim; he might have wished simply to satisfy his
feelings of racial hatred. Thus, like Mr. Johnson and his act of
flag burning, Mitchell must establish that he intended to
communicate an idea through his assault. Without this foundation,
there is no reason to be concerned that Mitchell's rights of free
speech have been compromised, let alone that they have been
violated. 117 Assuming that Mitchell can establish his intent to
communicate through assault, the question remains whether
Wisconsin nevertheless may regulate Mitchell's acts.

117

There is, of course, a difference between finding that a person's rights have been
compromised, and finding that those rights have been violated. A government policy
might intrude upon personal rights, yet not violate those rights. Government regulation
that touches upon an individual's free religious exercise is a common example. See,
e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding military regulations
prohibiting headwear as applied to Orthodox Jew's yarmulke); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding prohibition of bigamy as applied to Mormon).
Furthermore, it is possible that the government regulates a person
unconstitutionally, even if that individual's personal rights have not even been touched.
"[A]n individual whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited or
sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens others
not before the court - ·those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but
who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution .... " Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985).
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A. Burden to Prove What?: 'The Essence of a
·First Amendment Violation
1. Content Motivated Suppression of Communication
"[I]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable." 118 This principle is deeply rooted in
the political process paradigm for protecting speech.
A
governmental purpose to suppress ideas is antithetical to a concern
for free and open political dialogue in a democratic system.11 9 A
government that can purposefully suppress ideas can stifle the
evolution of social mores, the modification of law to reflect
changing values, and even can insulate itself from electoral
retribution. The Court has articulated this concern with contentmotivated suppression of ideas as compromising not only a
politically-oriented First Amendment, but one concerned with
personal fulfilment as well.
The constitutional right of free expression is .
intended to remove governmental restraints from
the arena of public discussion, putting the decision
as to what views shall be voiced largely into the
hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests. 120
118

Simon & Schusterv. Members ofN.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509
(1991); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
119
Alexander Meiklejohn made the point. "No speaker may be declared 'out of
order' because we disagree with what he intends to say. And the reason for this equality
of status in the field of ideas lies deep in the very foundations of the self-governing
process." MEIKLBJOHN, supra note 107, at 27.
120
Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508; Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438,
1444-45 (1991) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
'
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Justice Brennan confirmed this principle in Texas v.
Johnson. 121 If the government ·regulates conduct that some
defendants might have committed with the intent to communicate
ideas, it is prohibited from regulating motivated by concern for the
content of those ideas.
The Government generally has a freer hand in
restricting expressive conduct than it has · in
restricting the written or spoken word .. ·. . It may
not, however, proscribe particular conduct because
it has expressive elements ..... A law directed at
the communicative nature of conduct must, like a
law directed at speech itself, be justified by the
substantial showing of need that the First
Amendment requires. 122
Justice Brennan concluded with a point that bears emphasis. · '!It
is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the
expression, but the governmental interest at stake, that helps to
determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid. "123

2. Unconstitutional Effects Without Unconstitutional Intent?
Justice O'Connor has recently stated that "illicit legislative
intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment,"
and that "even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns
can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment. "124
Justice O'Connor made this statement in the
context of invalidating a statute that, in relevant substance, required
firms contracting to publicize a self-proclaimed criminal's accounts
of his criminal activities to "submit a copy of such contract to the

491 u .s. 397 (1989).
Id. at 414.
123
Id. at 406-07.
124
Simon & Sch1LSter, 112 S: Ct. at 509 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)).
121

122
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[New York Crime Victims Board] and pay over to the board any
moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing
to the person so accused or convicted or his representatives. "125 It is
not at all clear, however, why unintended effects in curtailing speech
should be deemed constitutionally significant, nor is it clear how a
court should determine what effects violate the First Amendment.
Indeed, taken seriously, a concern with the effects of policies
on speech, apart from whether those policies were animated by
impermissible censorial purposes, would have far reaching
implications. The federal government's grant of broadcast licenses
to particular commercial entities surely has harmful effects on the
speech interests of those not accorded licenses. The three major
television networks, NBC, ABC, and CBS, have access to speech
Laws
power that hundreds of millions of Americans do not.
defining property rights have effects on the speech interests of
millions. Ross Perot's billions enable him to speak so much as to
shape the public agenda and to create a presidential campaign. 126
Deep and broadly based poverty, and the laws of property entitlement
that perpetuate and reinforce that poverty, disable people from
pressing their concerns toward public consciousness -- unless, as
through rioting, for example, they destroy the valuables "owned" by
others. 127 Surely, from the perspective of the political process
paradigm of protected speech, the impact of the nation's property
laws is far more significant than the impact of New York's "Son of
Sam" law. Even from the perspective of the individual fulfilment
paradigm of protected speech, the dichotomy between Perot's power
of self-gratification and the powerless despair of two hundred million

125

Id. at SOS. Justice O"Connor found that the challenged statute was presumptively
unconstitutional for facially discriminating based on the content of speech. Id. at S08.
Justice O'Connor concluded that the state failed to meet its burden of proving that the
content discrimination was narrowly tailored to the goal of compensating victims and
preventing defendants from reaping the fruits of their crimes. Id. at 512. For further
discussion of burden of proof, see infra note 136; infra text at notes 132-S3.
126 Martha Burk, Let's Buy our own Election, USA TODAY, June 24, 1992, at 14A
(when Ross Perot is asked if he is buying the election, he often responds, 'TU buy it for
the American people.").
127 See Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our
Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. l, 32 (1987) ("the poor have no political power to
obtain a remedy legislatively .... ").
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would-be speakers is so great as to dwarf the significance of the "Son
of Sam" law's impact on a would-be-notorious criminal's interest in
self-fulfilment through speech.
Thus, one might question whether the substance of Justice
O'Connor's analysis was actually a finding that the state had failed
to demonstrate that it was not pursuing an impermissible purpose to
suppress certain unseemly messages, rather than a finding that, apart
from purpose, the New York regulation's effect "unduly" restricted
the exercise of First Amendment rights. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's
determination that the challenged regulation in Simon & Schuster was
"not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's objective of
compensating crime victims from the profits of crime" 128 is at least
consistent with a determination that the asserted legitimate interest
might not have been the state's actual interest. When a legislature
has chosen an ineffective means for serving an asserted end, one
might question the plausibility that the legislature actually was
animated by that asserted end. When a content-motivated purpose
better fits the chosen regulatory means, especially when a statute on
its face contains a content-based classification, it is reasonable to
conclude that the statute was adopted for impermissible purposes. 129
Thus, Justice O'Connor's finding that the challenged regulation was
"not narrowly tailored" to permissible compensatory purposes
supports an inference of impermissible content motivation. 130 There

128

Simon &: Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512.
See infra note 136.
130
Despite Justice O'Connor's statement that "illicit legislative intent is not the sine
qua non" of a First Amendment violation, Simon &: Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509, it is
difficult to identify a case in which the Court invalidated a statute on impact grounds that
could not have been decided on grounds of impermissible intent. Indeed, as suggested
in a recent Note, the Court generally has been tolerant of "unintended content-differential
effects." See Grannis, Note, supra note 29, at 206. The Note suggests two reasons for
this judicial "tolerance": "(l) the content-differential effects of facially-neutral statutes
are generally insubstantial and therefore unimportant; (2) such effects are likely to be
insubstantial unless they result from statutes designed specifically to cause them." Id.
Discussion in the text should be enough to raise serious questions about these
propositions. Facially neutral Jaws not designed to shape public discourse in any
particular way can nevertheless have profound consequences in determining who can
speak, with what power, and to what effect. See supra text at notes 125-28. Contentbased Jaws, clearly designed to suppress a point of view, might have a trivial effect on
speech. See, e.g., Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
129
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was no need to declare that "[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine
qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. "131
In any event, the following sections will address both how a
court should determine whether the Wisconsin statute was enacted
for impermissible content-motivated reasons, and how a court should
determine whether, assuming permissible, noncontent-motivated state
purposes, the Wisconsin statute might unduly affect constitutionally
protected speech interests.

B. Whose Burden of Proof?
1. R.A.V., O'Brien, and Johnson: The Wisconsin Statute
is Not Presumptively Facially Unconstitutional as Content-Based
Judge Heffernan quite rightly noted that "the first step in
reviewing a constitutional challenge to a statute is to determine which
party bears the burden of proving its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality." 132 He continued:
While the party challenging the statute ordinarily
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statute is unconstitutional, the burden
shifts to the proponent of the statute to establish its
constitutionality when the statute encroaches upon
First Amendment rights. Because the hate crimes
statute punishes the defendant's biased thought, ...
and thus encroaches on First Amendment rights, the
burden is on the state to prove its constitutionality. 133
Judge Heffernan thus placed the burden of proof on the state based
on two propositions. First, the hate crimes statute "encroaches on
First Amendment rights." Second, whenever a statute "encroaches
on First Amendment rights," the state must rebut a presumption of

131
Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.
v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)).
132
Id. at 811.
133

Id.
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unconstitutionality.
Analysis in Part II of this essay argued that the hate crimes
statute no more· "encroaches on First Amendment rights" than does
any other criminal law that makes liability a function of mens rea.
Thus, if the Wisconsin hate crimes statute presumptively violates the
First Amendment, then so does the larger part of any criminal code.
Furthermore, as suggested in Part III of this essay, Mitchell must
establish that he intended to communicate ideas symbolically through
assault as a prerequisite to any finding that his own First Amendment
interests have been compromised, let alone violated. To establish
that his First Amendment rights have been GOmpromised, Mitchell
must assert, and prove, that he intended to communicate an idea
through his assault.
More important for present purposes, the Supreme Court has
never held that a statute is presumptively unconstitutional whenever
it "encroaches upon First Amendment rights." Rather, as Justice
Scalia significantly declared in R.A. V., "[c]ontent-based regulations
are presumptively invalid. "134 "Governmental action that regulates
speech on the basis of its subject matter 'slips from the neutrality of
time, place, and circumstance into a concern about content. "'m
The first critical question for allocating the burden of proof,
therefore, .is not whether the Wisconsin statute "encroaches upon" or
compromises a defendant's intent to communicate, but whether the
Wisconsin statute regulates speech in a "content-based" way. 136 The

134
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (emphasis
added) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victim's Bd.,
112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991)); see also Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
135
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (quoting Police Dep 't of Chicago, 408 U.S.
at 99) (emphasis added).
•
136
·
If one views the essence of government action in violation· of the First
Amendment as content-motivated regulation, then the presumptive invalidity of contentbased regulation makes sense. When the government regulates based on content, it
makes sense to presume that it chose to regulate motivated by content. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARYL.
RBv. 189, 230 (1983) ("[T]he probability that an improper motivation has tainted a
decision to restrict expression is far greater when the re8triction is directed at a particular
idea, viewpoint, or item of information than when it is content-neutral. Indeed, in the
content-neutral context the risk of improper motivation is quite low, for such restrictions
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St. Paul statute challenged in R.A. V. discriminated between fighting
words that "arouse[ ] anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the

necessarily apply to all ideas . . . . "). This rationale for presuming content-based
regulation to be unconstitutional parallels a primary justification for presuming racebased regulation - i.e., racial classifications -- to violate the equal protection clause.
AB Chief Justice Burger stated, "Classifying persons according to their race is more
likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984). See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)
(Racial classifications are "in most circumstances irrelevant to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose."). In contrast, facially neutral government action is
accorded a strong presumption of constitutional permissibility against claims of
unconstitutional racial discrimination. This burden of proof makes sense because it is
so much less likely that the government has acted because of impermissible racial
prejudice when it regulates in a facially neutral way than when it regulates in a raciallyspecific way. See David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and
Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
790, 802 (1991).
But see Grannis, Note, supra note 29, at 204 ("Just as the standard of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials reflects the low value placed on punishment
in comparison to protecting the innocent, the low burden of proof placed upon the
government in justifying facially content-neutral regulations should be viewed as
indicative of the Court's assessment of constitutional values."). This, I suggest,
misapprehends factors that the Court has implicitly deemed significant in deciding how
to allocate burdens of proof in constitutional litigation. In the context of racial
discrimination, for example, the value of purging government policy of racist purposes
and premises is the same whether the government acts through a racial classification or
in a facially neutral way. What is different is the likelihood that the government has
pursued impermissible racist purposes. This difference in likelihood that the government
has acted unconstitutionally when employing a racial classification, and when not doing
so, justifies the different burdens of proof in the two contexts. The same rationale
applies to content-based regulations and facially content-neutral regulations. The value
of purging government policy of content-motivated purposes is the same in the two
contexts. What is different is the likelihood that the government has violated that value
in the two contexts.
If one believes that a regulation might unconstitutionally affect speech interests,
apart from impermissible legislative purpose, one might view content-based regulations
as presumptively unconstitutional for posing an excessive danger that the government
might "effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." Simon &
Schuster v. Members of N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991). The
direct, explicit regulation of ideas arguably poses a greater danger of completely
silencing them than do effects that are byproducts of otherwise directed regulations. See
Grannis, Note, supra note 29, at 206. This argument, however, is far from persuasive,
as, indeed, is the proposition that the First Amendment should be interpreted as
restricting government discretion as a function of unintended effects on speech interests.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender" and symbolic acts that
do not. 137 On the face of the statute, Minnesota revealed its concern
about the messages conveyed by symbolic acts, and its desire to
punish particular messages with which an audience would disagree to
the extent of "anger, alarm, or resentment. "138 Justice Scalia found
that there was "content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul
ordinance. "139
Those who wish to use "fighting words" in connection
with other ideas -- to express hostility, for example,
on the basis of political affiliation, union membership,
or homosexuality -- are not covered. The First
Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose
special prohibitions on those speakers who express
views on disfavored subjects. 140
From the conclusion that St. Paul was engaging in content-based
discrimination, Justice Scalia determined that the burden of proof
rests with the state:
Selectivity. of this sort creates the possibility that the
city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular
ideas. That selectivity would alone be enough to
render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St.
Paul's comments and concessions in this case elevate
that possibility to a certainty. 141
In contrast, the Wisconsin statute does not discriminate
according to an idea a defendant intended to express, or an idea
perceived by an offended audience. The statute is entirely silent
about different messages a defendant might communicate. Rather,
the Wisconsin statute discriminates based on the factors a defendant
considers in choosing the victim of his violence. Indeed, for

137

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.

138

Id.
Id. at 2548.
Id. at 2547.
Id. at 2549.

139
140

141
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purposes of allocating the burden of proving a First Amendment
violation, Justice Scalia explicitly recognized a clear distinction
between the St. Paul ordinance and a statute like Wisconsin's.
What we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a
prohibition of fighting words that are directed at
certain persons or groups (which would be facially
valid if it met the requirements of the equal protection
clause); but rather, a prohibition of fighting words
that contain (as the Minnesota Supreme Court
repeatedly emphasized) messages of "biasedmotivated" hatred and in particular, as applied to this
case, messages "based on virulent notions of racial
supremacy. "142
If a prohibition of fighting words directed at certain persons or
groups would be facially valid under the First Amendment, then a
prohibition of fighting action directed at certain persons or groups
should be facially valid as well. 143 Thus, R.A. V. 's stringent judicial
scrutiny of content-based regulations should not be triggered by
Wisconsin's facially content-neutral hate crimes statute.
United States v. O'Brien 144 and Texas v. Johnson 145 confirm
that the Wisconsin statute should not be deemed presumptively
unconstitutional as content-based.
In O'Brien, defendant was
convicted of violating a federal statute that threatened criminal
liability for one who "knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates"

142

Id. at 2548.
Because the Wisconsin statute prohibits such fighting actions not only directed
against certain groups, but directed against all groups defined in tenns of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry, it contains no racial,
ethnic, religious, or other classifications that should trigger strict judicial· scrutiny for
purposes impennissible under the equal protection clause. Indeed, as suggested by
Justice Bablitch 's dissenting opinion in State v. Mitchell, the Wisconsin hate crimes
statute is structurally indistinguishable from a broad range of anti-discrimination statutes.
The Wisconsin hate crimes statute prohibits racial and other reasons for discrimination
by criminals against their victims. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 820 (1992)
(Bablitch, J., dissenting); supra riote 82 and accompanying text.
144
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
145
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
143
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a Selective Service certificate -- that is, a draft card. 146 The Court
determined that the challenged regulation was not content-based
because it applied both to intentionally expressive conduct and to
conduct undertaken without expressive intent.
It prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates
issued by the Selective Service Syste111, and there is
nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct.
The Amendment does not distinguish between public
and private destruction, and it does not punish only

destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing
views. A law prohibiting destruction of Selective
Service certificates no more abridges free speech on
its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the
destruction ... of books and records.1 47
Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan determined
that defendant's challenge to Texas' prohibition of flag desecration
should not_ be treated as a facial challenge to a content-based
regulation, because the statute did not necessarily apply "only to
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. "148 Justice
Brennan reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Texas
statute, like the provision challenged in R.A. V., applied only to acts
that the defendant knows is likely to arouse anger or cause offense. 149
The basis for Justice Brennan's conclusion that the Texas statute
reached more than speech was his finding that one could violate the
statute with "no thought of expressing any idea. "150

146

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 375.

147

Id. (emphasis added).

148

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
The Texas flag desecration statute applied only if "the actor knows" his act "will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action." Johnson,
491 U.S. at 400 n.1 (quoting TIDC. PF.NAL CODE ANN. §42.o9(b) (1989)). The St. Paul
Ordinance invalidated in R.A. V. applied to symbolic fighting words that the defendant
"knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender . . . . " R.A. V., v. City of St.
Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992) (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LE.OIS. CODE §
292.02 (1990)).
150
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 n.3.
149
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Chief Justice Warren's reasons for finding the congressional
regulation of draft card burning not to present a content-based statute,
and Justice Brennan's reasons for determining that Texas' prohibition
of flag desecration should not be viewed as subject to facial challenge
as a content-based regulation, apply with equal force to Wisconsin's
hate crimes statute. There is "nothing necessarily expressive" about
hate motivated assault. A hate motivated criminal might, indeed,
intend to communicate a message, but also might intend simply to
have a good time or to blow off steam. The statute does not
distinguish between public and private hate motivated assault. Hate
motivated assaults through which the defendant intended to send a
message are not singled out. Hate motivated assaults that are
perceived to send a message are not singled out. Rather, the
Wisconsin statute provides for special criminalization of any assault
in which a defendant chose his victim because of the "race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or ancestry" of
his victim." m
In contrast, the St. Paul provision explicitly applied to acts of
placing a "symbol," "appellation," "characterization," or "graffiti,"
all of which connote the actor's intent to communicate an idea. 152
Furthermore, even more significant, the statute was interpreted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court as applying only to "fighting words,"
which, although deemed by the Court to be low value speech, are by
definition uttered or expressed with the intent to communicate an
idea. 153 The St. Paul ordinance, therefore, necessarily regulated

UI

152

W1s. STAT. § 939.645 (1989).

R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541. The statute also referred to placing an "object,"
which does not necessarily connote the actor's communicative intent. Nevertheless, the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute as applying only to "fighting
words" narrows the possible meaning of "object" to one placed with a communicative
intent. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
153
The language of the St. Paul ordinance, which prohibited the act of "plac[ing] on
public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika," could have been
interpreted as reaching one who abandoned some object with the relevant knowledge that
some might be offended. If the statute had been so interpreted, the O'Brien definition
of a content-based regulation would not have been satisfied, and the Johnson analysis of
when a statute should be examined for facial unconstitutionality would have demanded
an as applied scrutiny. Had the St. Paul ordinance not been construed to reach only
"fighting words," it would have reached not only those who, intending to communicate
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communicative activity. Under the Warren and Brennan tests for
content-based regulation -- whether a statute regulates only
intentionally expressive activity -- the St. Paul ordinance falls on one
side of the line; the congressional regulation of draft card burning,
the Texas regulation of flag burning, and the Wisconsin regulation of
hate crimes fall on the other side of the line.
Thus, Justice Scalia's reasons for viewing the Minnesota
regulation in R.A. V. as content-based do not apply to the Wisconsin
statute. The Minnesota statute in R.A. V. did discriminate based on
the ideas a defendant intended to express and the ideas perceived by
an audience; the Wisconsin statute does not. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Warren's and Justice Brennan's reasons for viewing the
congressional regulation of draft card burning and the Texas
regulation of flag burning as not content-based do apply to the
Wisconsin statute. The Wisconsin statute -- unlike the Minnesota
statute in R.A. V. -- applies to activity, regardless of its
communicative content, and whether or not the defendant intended to
communicate. Under both approaches, the Wisconsin statute is not
content-based.

2. Examining the Consti.tuti.onality of the
Wisconsin Sta.lute as Applied
Although the O'Brien Court did not view the statute to be
presumptively facially invalid as a content-based regulation, it
considered whether the statute was unconstitutional "in its application
to [the defendant]. "154 Chief Justice Warren first assumed, for
purposes of analysis, that O'Brien intended to convey an idea and,
therefore, that O'Brien's conduct amounted to symbolic speech
protected by the First Amendment. 155 He continued:

an idea, engage in constitutionally significant expression, but also those who, lacking the
intent to communicate an idea, have engaged in activity with which the First
Amendment's protection of "speech" has no special concern.
154
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
155 Jd.
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when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. . . . [A]
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 156

One might similarly assume for present purposes that Mitchell
intended to communicate a message through the assault of his victim.
If Wisconsin's statute can be applied to Mitchell without violating the
First Amendment, then, afoniori, it can constitutionally be applied
to those who lack the intent to communicate a message through
assault (but who nevertheless intentionally select their victims)
"because of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry of that person. "m
Wisconsin can justify its statute by asserting the purpose of
deterring hate motivated criminals.
Indeed, Judge Heffernan
acknowledged that "the motivation of the legislature [was] its desire
This justification for special
to suppress hate crimes." 158
criminalization of hate motivated violence reflects the view that biasmotivated criminals act because of special incentives, cause social
harms beyond those of ordinary street crime, and, therefore, require
special deterrence. 159 The criminal who kills or assaults because of

Id. at 376-77.
WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1989).
us State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817 (Wis. 1992). Elsewhere, however,
Judge Heffernan stated that "the statute commendably is designed to punish - and
thereby deter - racism and other objectionable biases." Id. at 814. For several reasons,
this should not be construed as an "authoritative statement" of legislative purpose by
which the Supreme Court deems itself bound. See supra note 25.
u9 See supra notes.6-7 and accompanying text.
l'6
157
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hatred has a special motivation that the ordinary felon does not. The
bias-motivated criminal inflicts pain for sport, for pleasure, for kicks,
or, perhaps, even for expressing a message. Indeed, the biasmotivated criminal might not view himself as a criminal at all but,
rather, as an agent of some higher morality or holder of some special
license. 160 The ordinary laws against assault or murder might well
not grab the attention of those motivated by hate to destroy bodies
and lives. 161 Defining a crime addressed specifically to potential bias
criminals could.
The purpose of specially deterring the murder or assault of
victims chosen because of race, religion, color, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, or ancestry is, on its face, unrelated to
the suppression of expression. One clearly can be concerned with
protecting individuals from physical harm regardless of the opinions
a defendant might -- or might not -- intend to express through murder
or assault. A concern for specially deterring hate motivated violence
reflects not the view that such violence might express offensive
opinions, but the view that ordinary assault laws do not put
perpetrators of such violence on adequate notice that they face
punishment for their crimes. 162
The goal of deterring hate motivated crimes -- toward
protecting the potential victims of such crimes -- is not only unrelated
to the suppression of freedom of expression, it reflects an undeniably
substantial responsibility of government. Concerns for law and
order, for safe streets, and for protecting law-abiding people from
violent victimization are far from the smug intolerance of "political
correctness." This state interest is so fundamental and pervasive as
surely to pass the O'Brien requirement of an "important" or
"substantial" interest. 163 The goal ofspecially deterring a particularly
hardy and virulent version of violent crime is an entirely plausible

160

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
162
Without these laws, potential criminals can receive the message that they will be
subject to less punishment for hate motivated murder. See, e.g., Censured judge is reelected, CHI. TRm., Mar. 16, 1990, at 18 ("A judge who was censured for saying he
gave a lenient sentence to a killer because the victims were 'queers' has been reelected.").
163
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968).
161
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state purpose -- at least as plausible as speculation that Wisconsin's
true, yet hidden, purpose is to suppress unpopular ideas.
Finally, the Wisconsin statute is closely related to the goal of
deterring hate motivated violence. Assuming the plausible factual
premises that hate motivated criminals view themselves differently
from those who commit ordinary murders or assaults, 164 and that hate
motivated criminals need the special deterrence of a statute directed
specifically to them,1 65 the "incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential" to achieve the
goal of protecting potential crime victims. 166 Those who hate are not
prohibited from expressing their views by any means other than
murder, assault, or destruction of property. Those who wish to
express their views through their hate crimes are subject to no more
punishment than are those who commit hate crimes for noncommunicative reasons.
The state could hardly serve its deterrence ends effectively if
it exempted those who expressed opinions through lynching. Those
defendant "speakers" cause as much public harm as hate motivated
criminals who intend no message.
Furthermore, allowing an
exemption from special punishment for those who wish to
communicate through hate motivated crime would virtually preclude
the statute's application to hate motivated criminals who do not intend
to communicate. These criminals, who lack any First Amendment
interest at all,1 67 could falsely claim that they intended to express a
message and, indeed, could construct their crime to make the claim,
though pretextual, sufficiently plausible to raise reasonable doubt.
Indeed, simply to suggest the possibility of exempting those
who lynch from a general provision that provides special penalties for
hate motivated violence is to refute its plausibility. The First
Amendment cannot plausibly be interpreted as requiring a state that
wishes to provide special punishment for hate motivated crime to
exempt those with speech interests who wish to make a point. Just
as First Amendment interests are minimally and acceptably
compromised by punishing the terrorist bank robber who wished to

164
165
1
&1

167

See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
See supra text at notes 98-116; infra note 184.
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make a point no differently from the bank robber who simply wanted
money, so First Amendment interests are minimally and acceptably
compromised by punishing the hate motivated murderer who wished
to make a point no differently from the hate motivated murderer who
simply wanted a good time. As Justice Scalia himself unambiguously
noted in R.A. V., "[w]here the government does not target conduct on
the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from
regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or
philosophy. "168
This analysis holds whether the essence of an unconstitutional
intrusion on speech is viewed in terms of impermissible contentmotivated purposes, 169 or undue effects on the vitality of certain
ideas. 17 Finding that the Wisconsin statute furthers a purpose
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that its purpose is "substantial,"
and that the means chosen intrude on speech interests no more than
is necessary, suggests more than a plausibility, but a probability, that
the challenged provision was in no way tainted by impermissible
concerns with the content of communicated ideas. 171
Furthermore, because these 0 'Brien findings also support the
conclusion that the challenged statute has an incidental impact on the
communication of hate motivated concerns no greater than necessary
to achieve the valid, uncontroversial, and plausible state objective of
ensuring public security, concern about undue effect on the vitality
of certain ideas should be mitigated. The regulation does not prohibit
expression about subjects, does not prohibit expression of particular
viewpoints, but prohibits only certain acts through which people
might wish to communicate. This regulation creates no realistic risk
of "effectively driv[ing] certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace." 172 A defendant who claims that he must bash a
homosexual's head to express anti-gay sentiments, or kill an African-

°

11511

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546-47 (1992). Justice
Scalia noted that "sexually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may
produce a violation of Title Vll's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in
employment practices." Id. at 2546 (citations omitted).
169
See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
170
See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 136.
172 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victim's Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501, 508 (1992). See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
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American as social commentary on race, has many other effective
means for expressing his views: the poster, the placard, the
newspaper advertisement, the letter to the editor, the telephone call
to C-SPAN, the sound truck, the parade, and, indeed, even the
"fighting word."

V. Lynching and Terrorism as "Unprotected Speech" -Despite the Intent to Convey an Idea
This analysis is sufficient to uphold the Wisconsin statute.
Consider, however, a stronger proposition: Lynching and terrorism,
like obscenity and fighting words, should be deemed "unprotected
speech" -- against which the government has a broader regulatory
discretion. 173
If "fighting words" are unprotected, it easily follows that
words through fighting, or communication through murder -- or
lynching -- should be deemed similarly unprotected speech. The
Court has defined "fighting words" as words "which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. "174 Justice Murphy elaborated that "such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality. "m
.The "injury" about which Justice Murphy spoke was hurt
feelings. 176 This injury might be viewed as perilously close to taking
offense from an idea with which one disagrees -- an injury that the

17.S If lynching is "unprotected" expression, then the government has broader
regulatory discretion to target such expression "because of [its] constitutionally
proscribable content." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543
(1992). Thus, the government may, in ways later discussed, do more than treat hate
motivated crime intended to communicate a message ~e same as it treats hate motivated
crime not intended to communicate a message; it may choose to target hate motivated
crimes-as-communication for s}>ecial punishment.
See infra notes 185-96 and
accompanying text.
174
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).

i1J

Id.
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Court today clearly views not only as inadequate to justify regulation,
but an impermissible basis for regulation. m So do the notions of
"prurience" and "redeem_ing social value," which underlie the Court's
definition of constitutionally unprotected "obscenity. "178 As Justice
Scalia stated in R.A. V., "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct,
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. "179 Yet Justice
Murphy's concern with "fighting words" on the ground that they
"tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" provides a second
basis for defining unprotected fighting words, a basis that is more
content-neutral. This factor is consistent with the Court's view that
a legislature may prohibit the advocacy of illegality if such advocacy
creates a "clear and present danger" of illegality 180 or if the advocacy
"is likely to incite or produce such [lawless] action. "181
·
However strong these two factors are in defining "fighting
words" and in justifying the notion that "fighting words" are
"unprotected speech," they apply far more strongly to lynching -- that
is, to words through.fighting. Words thro~gh fighting by their very
"utterance" inflict injury., The injury, however, is not the
problematic notion of insult or sense of feeling offended. Rather, the
injury is palpable physical harm. Furthermore, not only does
lynching meet the "fighting words" standard of "tend[ing] to incite an
immediate breach of the peace;" 182 lynching is an immedia.te breach
of the peace. Words through .fighting are not merely likely to
produce illegality; they are illegality.
Not only does lynching qualify as "unprotected speech" under
the Chaplinsky rationale, it fails to satisfy either the 'political debate
rationale for protecting speech or the personal fulfilment rationale for
protecting speech. The point of the political rationale for protecting
177

As Justice Brennan stated in Texas v. Johnson, with respect to symbolic speech
not deemed to be "unprotected" or "low value": The Government generally has a freer
hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken
word .... It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive
elements." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
178
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). ·
179
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citations omitted).
180 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
181
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
182
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added).
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speech is to facilitate democratic decisionmaking. Democratic
decisionmaking is elevated as the higher value served by free speech.
One who seeks to speak as a lyncher through criminal acts of assault
or murder, or to communicate as a terrorist through arson or
kidnapping, has stepped beyond the bounds of democracy. By acting
illegally, the individual denies the ultimate authority of the democratic
system that has created the laws criminalizing his conduct. To
protect the speaker whose means of communication denies the
authority of the democratic system, as a way of serving the
de11Wcratic system, would be perverse. 183
The point of the personal fulfilment rationale for protecting
speech is to respect the individual's claim to personal autonomy and
fulfilment through the communication of ideas. The individual who
expresses words through fighting, however, seeks personal fulfilment
at the expense of another individual's physical pain or death. Only
an unnatural commitment to individual fulfilment through
communication could justify the idea that the joy of lynching, or
terrorism, or words through fighting, deserves protection as First
Amendment "speech. "184

183

Alexander Meiklejohn, operating within a paradigm that viewed the freedom of
speech as essential to democratic self-government, noted that the First Amendment "does
not forbid the abridging of speech," as it surely allows the punishment of "words which
incite men to crime." MBIKLFJOHN, supra note 107, at 21. "But, at the same time, it
does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech." Id. Meiklejohn himself, therefore,
distinguished between protected and unprotected speech -- or, in his words, between
speech and the freedom ofspeech. As he included the incitement to crime as unprotected
speech, so he would likely include speech through criminal acts as not part of the
freedom of speech.
184
These principles apply with equal force to the narrower communicative intent with
which some might commit their crimes - e.g., the basher who intends the message to
his assault victim, "You deserve to suffer physical pain." See supra note 111. The
democratic process rationale for protecting speech is undermined, not served, by the
"speaker" who violates the laws enacted by democracy through his method of
communication. The individual fulfilment rationale could hardly reach to protect the
speaker whose method of communication is achieved at the expense of his victim's
bodily integrity.
These principles can supply content to the 0 'Brien admonition about symbolic
speech. It is not necessarily true, the Court cautioned, that "an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376
(1968). Cf. Grannis, Note, supra note 29, at 218 (O'Brien admonition might reflect
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***
Establishing that lynching or terrorism is "unprotected" or
"low value" speech is significant in the context of Justice Scalia's
treatment of the government's regulatory discretion. In Justice
Scalia's view, categories of "unprotected" speech "can, consistently
with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their
constitutiona.lly proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)" 185
but they may not "be made the vehicles for content discrimination
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further
content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government. "186 Justice Scalia further reasoned that:
when the basis for the content discrimination consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech
at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea
or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason,
having been adjudged neutral enough to support
exclusion of the entire class of speech from First
Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form

mere "cunnudgeonly impatience" with claims of speech interests rather than imply
principles to limit the category of symbolic speech). Indeed, the fact that the Court has
detennined that the advocacy of illegal action, terroristic threats, fighting words, and
obscenity are "low value" or unprotected speech- despite the intent to communicatesuggests the existence of such limiting principles. The proposition that neither the
political debate rationale for protecting speech, nor the personal fulfilment rationale, are
served by communication through assault, attempts to define what is protected "speech,"
and what is not, by reference to first principles.
It is important to understand that my concern here is not simply whether the
government violates First Amendment rights by punishing a defendant who committed
assault with the intent to communicate the message, "I want you to suffer.• The
proposition is not that the message one might intend to communicate symbolically though
a crime is protected, but regulable to achieve overriding state interests. Rather, the
proposition is more fundamental: Symbolic communication through criminal acts should
not be deemed of any value for First Amendment purposes, but should be deemed
"unprotected," as are fighting words and obscenity. This distinction is important toward
detennining the scope of the government's regulatory discretion to target crimes
committed as symbolic speech. See infra text at notes 186-96; note 196.
185
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992).
186 Jd.
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the basis of distinction within the class. 187

Qased on this principle Justice Scalia suggested that the state
might discriminate among forms of obscenity based on the degree of
prurience -- proscribing only the most prurient, for example, because
prurience is the essential aspect defining obscenity and provides the
essential reason obscenity is unprotected. 188 Justice Scalia made a
further observation particularly significant for hate crimes statutes and
for the question of whether lynching -- that is, speech through assault
or murder -- should be deemed "unprotected" speech:
[T]he federal government can criminalize only those
threats of violence that are directed against the
President, . . . since the reasons why threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting
individuals from the fear of violence, from the
disruption that fear engenders, and from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur)
have special force when applied to the person of the
President. . . . But the Federal Government may not
criminalize only those threats against the President
that mention his policy on aid to inner cities. 189
If lynching or terrorism -- i.e., violent criminality intended as
political commentary -- is "unprotected speech," then the government
may target lynching and terrorism for special punishment, just as it
may target fighting words and obscenity for special punishment.
Furthermore, the government may single out certain forms of
lynching or terrorism if the reasons for the unprotected nature of
"words through fighting" have special force with respect to the forms
or contexts singled out. Following the above passage from Justice
Scalia's R.A. V. analysis, the government might single out terrorism
against fifty story buildings, or terrorism against government
functions, because the reasons that "words through fighting" are not
protected -- i.e., physical harm and illegal action -- have special force
187

188
189

Id. at 2545-46.
Id. at 2546.
Id.
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in these contexts. The consequences of harm from terrorism against
tall buildings or government functions are plausibly viewed as more
significant than the consequences of harm from terrorism otherwise
directed.
Similarly, the government might single out lynching motivated
by the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national
origin, or ancestry of the victim based on the view that the risks of
physical harm and illegal action are especially significant. The
government might wish to provide special penalties for lynching in
these contexts based on the view that the risk of physical harm and
illegality, and, therefore, the need for deterrence, is greater in these
contexts. Those tempted. to speak through hate motivated criminal
violence might be single-minded zealots who need special deterrence
specifically directed at them. 190 If the government provides special

190

One researcher has found differences in the attitudes of "terrorist" skinheads and
"non-terrorist" skinheads:
First, terrorists are more likely to focus their hostility against people
they perceive to have 'bad manners, habits, and breeding.' This is
the essence of racism, and this finding is consistent with the seminal
work of Adorno et al. . . . . Second, terrorists are more likely to
advocate 'getting rid of immoral, crooked, and feeble-minded
people.' . . . In Ronald Dillehay's ever-insightful words, 'The
essence of conspiracy theories is that they forecast imminent doom
for cherished values and institutions, with the impending disaster
attributed to a carefully conceived plan of action surreptitiously
controlled and conditioned by a diabolical enemy.' . . . Third,
terrorists are more likely to hold strong opinions about homosexuals.
This finding is also consistent with the Berkeley studies that
demonstrate authoritarians typically hold negative attitudes toward a
broad range of out-groups (Adorno et al., 1950).
HAMM, supra note 7, at 124-25. To qualify as terrorists, subjects had to satisfy three

criteria:
(1) they must have indicated that the joined their group to fight for
the survival of their race (thereby establishing grounds for the
political or social objectives of their violence), (2) they must have
engaged in one or two fights in which, (3) at least half were against
people of another race (thus satisfying the operational definitions of
both terrorism and hate crime).
Id. at 109-10. This definition of terrorism does not quite justify the conclusion that all
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punishment for hate motivated lynching -- that is, hate motivated
violence commined as political commentary -- based on a perceived
need for extra deterrence against the resulting physical harm and
illegality, it is because the reasons why "words through fighting" are
unprotected "have special force" in this context.
Justice Scalia provides one more "valid basis for according
differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of
proscribable speech" -- "the subclass happens to be associated with
particular 'secondary effects' of the speech, so that the regulation is
'justified without reference to the content of the speech. '" 191 This
principle would allow a state to "permit all obscene live performances
except those involving minors," if the justification for the exception
is unrelated to the content of the speech. 192 Presumably, protecting
the welfare of minors is such a content-neutral justification.
Furthermore, "sexually derogatory 'fighting words' ... may produce
a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
Presumably, a
discrimination in employment practices." 193
justification of protecting women against harm in the workplace
provides a content-neutral justification. As Justice Scalia suggests,
"[t]hese bases for distinction refute the proposition that the selectivity
of the restriction is 'even arguably conditioned upon the sovereign's
agreement with what a speaker may intend to say. "' 194 Similarly,
prohibition of hate motivated lynching can be upheld as a contentdefined subclass of proscribable (i.e., constitutionally "unprotected")
"words through fighting." The justification of preventing the
"secondary effects" of physical harms and illegality is articulated
"without reference to the content of the speech," but only with

"terrorists" committed each of their assaults to communicate a message - some assaults
still might have been committed just for sport. But to the extent that the "terrorists"
joined their group for broad political ends, it seems likely that they would also commit
their assaults to achieve broad political ends. Thus, Hamm's generalizations about the
attitudes of "terrorists" would seem to support the proposition that those who commit
hate motivated assaults to communicate a message may require special deterrence.
191
R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 48 (1986)).
192

193
194

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2547 (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 555 (1981))

(Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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reference to the special incentives that lynchers (and terrorists) seem
to have for acting.
If the state may specifically target hate motivated lynching, or
terrorism directed against specific victims -- if, in other words, the
state may specifically target the assault as message, the words
through fighting -- then it follows, afoniori, that the state may take
the less discriminatory approach of specially punishing all hate
motivated assaults in which a defendant selects his victim because of
race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, or
ancestry, whether communicative or not. As "a particular contentbased subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up
incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather
than speech," in other words, as the state may target a subclass of
"unprotected speech" if the regulation is "justified without reference
to the content of the speech," so the government may regulate
without targeting "speech" at all -- as has Wisconsin.
Wisconsin's regulation addresses hate motivated violence
whether intended as political commentary or not. Wisconsin justifies
its regulation in a content-neutral way. At worst, Wisconsin's
regulation incidentally reaches "low value" or "unprotected"
lynching, terrorism, words through fighting, or murder-as-message.
If, as the foregoing analysis suggests, Wisconsin could specifically
target the hate motivated lynching -- the hate motivated assault with
the strongest claim to First Amendment protection -- for purposes of
deterring physical harm and illegality, then surely Wisconsin can, for
the same purposes, regulate hate motivated assault more broadly. If
a regulation targeted at assault-as-message is deemed not "even
arguably conditioned upon the sovereign's agreement with what a
speaker may intend to say, "195 then a regulation aimed more broadly,
at conduct irrespective of any intended communication, is even less
likely animated by an impermissible censorial motive. 196
195
Jd. (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 4S3 U.S. 490, SSS (1981)) (Stevens,
J., dissenting in part).
1915
The utility of detennining that terrorism and, implicitly, lynching is unprotected
"speech," despite an intent to communicate ideas, has been questioned. See Grannis,
Note, supra note 29, at 218 ("Obviously, a law against blowing up federal buildings will
not be struck down, but the validity of this law results merely from the existence of
legitimate state interests under the 0 'Brien test; to move this consideration back one step
into the definition of expressive conduct would appear redundant."). Yet, identifying
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Otherwise discerning people seem to have viewed the legal
issues surrounding hate crimes statutes through a distortive lens.
Fundamental distinctions, unchallenged in other contexts, have been
blurred in a rush to find free speech interests in hate motivated
murder and assault. Fundamental distinctions between thoughts and
action have been neglected in reviewing state authority to punish
criminals motivated by hate. Fundamental and familiar patterns of
terrorism as "unprotected speech" would not be "redundant" if the state were to provide
special penalties for blowing up a federal building/or purposes ofpolitical commentary.
The permissibility of targeting acts done with communicative intent depends on whether
the communicative intent is protected. The government might believe that special
deterrence of terrorism - arson intended to send a message, as opposed to arson for
other purposes - is warranted because terrorists have special incentives to act that are
particularly resistant to threats of punishment and, therefore, that more of the
government's deterrence resources should be allocated against arson-as-message than
against ordinary arson. Similarly, identifying lynching - i.e., words through .fighting
- as "unprotected speech" would not be redundant, for doing so would create
government discretion to target lynching for special punishment. Here, the government
might believe that those inclined to express messages of hatred through assault have
special incentives to act that are particularly resistant to threats of punishment. As the
government may try to stamp out all obscenity, all fighting words, and all other forms
of "unprotected speech," so it may try to stamp out all terrorism (arson with the intent
to send a message) and all lynching (assault with the intent to send a message) - if arson
and lynching are unprotected or low value speech.
Furthermore, the government may select a subgroup of unprotected speech for
special punishment if "the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech is proscribable," - if the very "reasons that [the
speech is] outside the First Amendment" have "special force" in the contexts the state
has chosen for special criminalization. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543, 2545. Again, as
suggested in the text, if the government may try to target all terrorism or lynching
(because they are "unprotected speech") and may specially target especially dangerous
categories of terrorism or lynching (because they are unprotected based on their
underlying dangerous criminality), then it follows that the government may more broadly
punish the bombing of a building, where the defendant intentionally selected a federal
building, or more broadly punish the assault of a person, where the defendant
intentionally selected a person because of race, despite reaching those who bomb or
assault with the intent to convey a message. Here, the government is not targeting
communicative arsons or assaults - though it could if they were unprotected speech.
Rather, the government is targeting all bombings in which a defendant intentionally
selects a federal building, or all assaults in which a defendant intentionally selects his
victim because of race.
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defining criminal liability based on different purposes, intentions, or
motives underlying the same acts -- defining, quite simply, different
choices -- have been overlooked entirely in seeing something sinister,
odd, and unconstitutional, in punishing the criminal choices of one
motivated by hate differently from the quite different criminal choices
of one not motivated by hate.
The Wisconsin hate crimes statute· is not a content-based
regulation of speech, but a message-neutral regulation of hate
As such, it is not properly viewed as
motivated action.
presumptively unconstitutional and not properly subject to a facial
challenge. Although the Wisconsin statute might be applied to a hate
motivated lyncher who wishes to communicate a social message
through his act of assault, so many criminal statutes might be applied
to those who wish to engage in symbolic speech through otherwise
criminal acts. The dispositive point is precisely that hate motivated
assault, whether or not a defendant intends thereby to communicate
a social message, is otherwise criminal. Neither the purpose of
preventing harms through specially deterring hate motivated crime,
nor the effect on those who wish to communicate messages of hate,
warrant invalidating a prosecution under the statute -- even as applied
to a defendant who claims the intent to communicate social
commentary through his assault.
American society seems increasingly gripped by violence.
The violence has varied roots and objectives. Sometimes it is
committed by those in search of a good time. Causing pain and
suffering is fun for some, and for some of these, the fun is all the
better when inflicted on a victim hated because of race, national
origin, religion, disability, or sexual orientation. Sometimes violence
is committed by those with a political ax to grind -- whether those
who wish to communicate messages of racial hatred through a latter
day lynching, those who wish to communicate messages of sexual
morality through gay-bashing, or, indeed, those who wish to
communicate messages of international justice through terrorism.
Whether a message is intended or not, the violence is real, harmful,_
and a matter of legitimate state concern. A state might conclude that
whether or not a person intends to send a message through his hate
motivated crime, the motive of hate creates a context in which special
deterrence is required. To allow states discretion to target such hate
motivated crime maintains their role as public policy· laboratories in
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our federal system.
Those motivated by hate might wish to draw boundaries
among people, to foster intolerance, to promote public policies.
That, certainly, is their right under the First Amendment. Under
Wisconsin's hate crimes statute, they retain that right. Those who
wish to communicate messages of hate can do so by speaking on a
street corner, by writing a pamphlet, by calling C-SPAN, by running
for President; they simply are denied the right to express their view
through the symbolism of invading the first civil right of every
American -- the right to freedom from physical harm.

